Algorithmic Challenges to Autonomous Choice by Gal, Michal S.
Michigan Technology Law Review 
Volume 25 Article 3 
2018 
Algorithmic Challenges to Autonomous Choice 
Michal S. Gal 
University of Haifa 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mtlr 
Recommended Citation 
Michal S. Gal, Algorithmic Challenges to Autonomous Choice, 25 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 59 
(2018). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mtlr/vol25/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Technology Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
ALGORITHMIC CHALLENGES TO 
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“I never think of the future. It comes soon enough. . .”
Albert Einstein
I. Introduction............................................................................. 60
II. Choice in the Digital World ................................................. 64
A. Technological Abilities of Algorithmic Assistants ................ 64
B. A Taxonomy of Algorithmic Assistants ................................. 66
C. The Effects of Algorithms on Choice .................................... 70
III. The Role of Autonomous Choice.......................................... 75
A. Rationales for Promoting Autonomous Choice .................... 75
1. Efficiency Rationales ..................................................... 76
2. Psychological Rationales ............................................... 77
3. Liberty Rationales.......................................................... 78
B. How the Rationales Are Affected by Algorithmic 
Assistants .............................................................................. 80
1. Efficiency Rationales ..................................................... 80
2. Psychological Rationales ............................................... 84
3. Liberal Theory Rationales.............................................. 87
IV. Legal Implications of Changes in Autonomous Choice.... 91
A. Should the Use of Algorithmic Assistants be Allowed? ........ 91
B. Regulatory Challenges of Algorithmic Decision-Making..... 96
1. Assent............................................................................. 96
2. Intent .............................................................................. 98
3. Regulatory Tools that Promote Negative Freedom........ 101
V. Conclusion................................................................................ 103
Professor and Director of the Forum for Law and Markets, University of Haifa 
Faculty of Law, and President of the International Association of Competition Law Scholars 
(ASCOLA). I would like to thank Karni Chagal, Eran Fish, Nizan Geslevich Packin, Bill Ko-
vacic Shaul Smilanski, and Jonathan Yovel as well as participants at the OECD Panel on Al-
gorithms and Collusion, the Oxford Conference on Digital Markets, the UK Competition and 
Markets Authority Distinguished Speaker Series, and the New Zealand Commerce Commis-
sion’s bi-Annual Conference, and participants in seminars in Harvard, NYU and Columbia 
Universities, as well as the Center for Cyber Law and Policy, for most helpful discussions 
and/or comments on previous drafts. Omer Balas, Lior Frank, Roman Magril and Daniel Sil-
verman for most helpful research assistance. The editors of this journal provided superb 
comments and suggestions. This research was supported by the I-CORE Program of the Plan-
ning and Budgeting Committee and the Israel Science Foundation, and by the Minerva Center 
for the Rule of Law under Extreme Conditions. Any mistakes or omissions remain the au-
thor’s. The paper was partly written while I was a Visiting Professor at Columbia University 
(Fall 2016). I thank them for their warm hospitability and the invigorating environment.
59
60 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 25:59
I. Introduction
Human choice is a foundational part of our social, economic and politi-
cal institutions. Many decisions that in the past were determined by birth, 
religion, or social rank are now determined by individuals, whether inde-
pendently or collectively. Our political and market systems, for example, 
are largely based on the aggregation of human choices. This is not to say 
that choices are unlimited. The state places limits on some types of actions, 
such as how we can express our aggressions or joys, while market forces 
and technological limitations determine the menu of options from which we 
can choose. Yet human choice is an integral and fundamental part of our 
private and public lives.
This focus is about to be significantly challenged, at least in the mar-
ketplace. Technological advances in data collection, data science, artificial 
intelligence, and communications systems are ushering in a new era in 
which digital agents, operated through algorithms, replace human choice 
with regard to many transactions and actions.1 While algorithms are given 
assignments, they autonomously determine how to carry them out. Indeed, 
scientists envision a near future “where humans do less thinking when it 
comes to the small decisions that make up daily life.”2
The day when algorithms will be able to make choices for users and 
carry them out is already here. This digital revolution has taken place in 
some supply markets, such as online trading,3 and is now fast expanding in 
consumption markets. This remarkable transformation is happening thanks 
not only to developments in technology, but also to the increasing openness 
among users to having digital assistants make decisions for them.4 While the 
first generation of consumer-oriented algorithms suggested products, ser-
vices or actions for users to choose from (e.g., Kayak, Yelp, Amazon, etc.),
those in the second generation make a decisions for the user rather than 
merely a suggestion, and automatically proceed to execute the actions or the 
transactions based on the decision, on the user’s behalf (“algorithmic assis-
tants”). To give a few examples, Samsung sells a washing machine which 
detects when detergent levels are low and automatically orders new deter-
1. See Yuval Noah Harrari, Yuval Noah Harari on Big Data, Google, and the End of 
Free Will, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/50bb4830-6a4c-11e6-
ae5b-a7cc5dd5a28c.
2. See Danny Yadron, Google Assistant Takes on Amazon and Apple To Be the Ulti-
mate Digital Butler, GUARDIAN, (May 18, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2016/may/18/google-home-assistant-amazon-echo-apple-siri.
3. See, e.g., Gregory Scopino, Do Automated Trading Systems Dream of Manipulating 
the Price of Futures Contracts? Policing Markets for Improper Trading Practices by Algo-
rithmic Robots, 67 FLA. L. R. 221 (2015).
4. See Pedro Domingos, Get Ready For Your Digital Model, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 12,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/get-ready-for-your-digital-model-1447351480.
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gent;5 Self-driving cars, already on the road in some localities, make a full 
range of driving decisions, from what route to take and when to fill the gas 
tank to how to engage with other vehicles and road users;6 The British ap-
plication Flipper monitors prices in the energy market and automatically 
switches suppliers for its users when it is profitable;7 and a Hong Kong ven-
ture fund called Deep Knowledge Ventures appointed an algorithm to its 
board, enabling it to vote on investment decisions alongside its five human 
directors.8
Algorithmic assistants have much to offer. They offer speed, lower 
transaction costs and efficiency in decision-making, thereby enabling the 
user to enjoy lower cost and higher quality products.9 Furthermore, artificial 
intelligence coupled with the analysis of big data enables algorithms to 
make more sophisticated choices. Accordingly, the algorithm’s choices 
might sometimes suit the user’s needs better than his own choices, which 
could be biased or based on limited information. Computer scientists predict 
that as more data about human actions and choices is accumulated and ana-
lyzed, the algorithm might know us better than ourselves.10
We will (hopefully) never reach the Matrix trilogy’s vision of a world 
in which a computer makes all the choices for us while we float in a bubble, 
oblivious to the true nature of our reality.11 But like the apple in the garden, 
5. Stan Higgins, IBM Reveals Proof of Concept for Blockchain-Powered Internet of 
Things, COINDESK (Jan. 17, 2015, 7:12 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/ibm-reveals-proof-
concept-blockchain-powered-internet-things; SANJAY PANIKER ET AL., ADEPT: AN IOT
PRACTITIONER PERSPECTIVE 13 (Draft. Copy for Advance Review, Jan. 7, 2015), 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/252917347/IBM-ADEPT-Practictioner-Perspective-Pre-
Publication-Draft-7-Jan-2015.
6. See, e.g., JOHN MCCARTHY ET AL., CONNECTED AND AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES:
INTRODUCING THE FUTURE OF MOBILITY (2015), https://www.atkinsglobal.com/~/media/
Files/A/Atkins-Corporate/uk-and-europe/uk-thought-leadership/reports/CAV_A4_
080216.pdf.
7. Flipper Team and Beyond, FLIPPER https://flipper.community/company/about, (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2018).
8. Rob Wile, A Venture Capital Firm Just Named an Algorithm to Its Board of Direc-
tors — Here’s What It Actually Does, BUS. INSIDER (May 13, 2014), http://
www.businessinsider.com/vital-named-to-board-2014-5.
9. ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE 
AND PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY 191 (2016); Michal S. Gal & Niva 
Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Consumers, 30 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 309, 311 (2017).
10. See, e.g., James Max Kaanter & Kalyan Veeramachaneni, Deep Feature Synthesis: 
Towards Automating Data Science Endeavors, IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DATA 
SCIENCE AND ADVANCED ANALYTICS, (Oct. 2015), http://groups.csail.mit.edu/EVO-
DesignOpt/groupWebSite/uploads/Site/DSAA_DSM_2015.pdf (reporting on an experiment in 
which the algorithm better predicted human behavior than humans).
11. THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999); THE MATRIX RELOADED (Warner Bros. 2003); 
THE MATRIX REVOLUTIONS (Warner Bros. 2003). Observe that in the movie human choice is 
revered.
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once tasted, algorithmic assistants may be impossible to live without.12 Ped-
ro Domingo, professor of computer science, predicts that “a decade from 
now, your personal model will be more indispensable than your 
smartphone.”13 This is because “[a]lgorithms will build data-driven alter 
egos for us that can do job interviews [and] shop for cars.”14 Indeed, “[s]oon 
enough, facing the fog of life without a good model to guide you will seem 
unendurable.”15 Furthermore, in a competitive world, market players who 
prefer to exercise their own decision-making power will not necessarily al-
ways have a meaningful ability to do so, given the comparative advantages 
of those using algorithms. Possible expectations that humans should be aid-
ed by algorithmic decision-making—thereby replacing the “reasonable per-
son” with a “reasonable algorithm,” at least in some areas16—might further 
limit one’s genuine ability to make autonomous choices. Indeed, regulators 
are already encouraging the use of algorithms in some fields.17
This technological change goes to the heart of autonomous human 
choice.18 The user, voluntarily and willingly, removes himself from the de-
cision-making process.19 Of course, he chooses which algorithm to employ20
12. Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an In-
formation Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75, 83 (2015).
13. Domingos, supra note 4.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm of 
Tort Liability, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2018) (arguing that once computers become safer 
than people, they should become the new standard for care).
17. See, e.g., Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Reg. Af-
fairs, Informing Consumers through Smart Disclosure 2 (Sept. 8, 2011), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/informing-
consumers-through-smart-disclosure.pdf (directing all administrative agencies to pursue 
“smart disclosures” that provide consumers with access to the information they need to make 
informed decisions in machine readable data formats, in order to fuel the creation of interac-
tive tools for consumers).
18. Of course, the use of algorithms raises other concerns as well, such as the dis-
placement of human workers and a more limited ability of those contracting with the algo-
rithm to raise arguments designed to “change its mind,” given that it requires going back to 
the algorithm’s designer. These issues are beyond the scope of this article, which focuses on 
human autonomous choice. We acknowledge that autonomy eludes a clear definition, and is a 
matter of degree. See Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Infor-
mation, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 32-35 (2001). In this article we allude to it as con-
cerning the degree to which a person can be the author of his life, all constraints considered. 
Finally, a sub-set of the issues raised in this article can be applied to corporations that use al-
gorithmic assistants as well.
19. In this article we mainly focus on the effects on the user of the algorithm, rather 
than on third parties involuntarily affected or subjected to algorithmic decisions. For issues 
that relate to third parties, see, e.g., Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L. J. 1245 
(2016) (arguing that the use of machines and automated processes in the criminal justice sys-
tem is problematic, inter alia, since they compromise dignity, equity, and mercy); Tal Zarsky, 
The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions: An Analytic Road Map to Examine Efficiency and 
Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision Making, 41(1) SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES
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and may set at least part of the decision parameters. But other choices then 
follow automatically, in which the algorithm exercises its own judgment. 
Furthermore, due to developments in deep learning, a process by which the 
algorithm’s decision parameters are continuously updated and refined based 
on data analysis, 21 the user might have no information about which parame-
ters underlie the algorithm’s choice, or how much weight is given to each 
parameter. Alternatively, the user might not have the capacity or the permis-
sion to exercise effective control over the algorithm’s choices. One might 
say that this is a significant technological nail in the coffin of human choice, 
which follows the previous narrowing of choice through phenomena such as 
choice architecture and echo chambers.22
It is therefore time to explore whether and, if so, under which condi-
tions, are we willing to give up our autonomous choice, and how autono-
mous algorithmic assistants affect existing laws which were designed to ap-
ply to human choice. Answering the first question requires us to explore the 
rationales that stand at the basis of autonomous human choice, and how they 
are affected by algorithmic assistants; to conscientiously contend with the 
“choice paradox” which arises from the fact that the decision to turn over 
one’s choices to an algorithm is, itself, an act of choice. It also requires us to 
think seriously about the way in which the choices we make affect our val-
ues, identities, and the meaning and content of our lives.
We then explore how autonomous algorithmic assistants affect the legal 
framework. Some issues challenge the very use of algorithmic assistants: 
Should the law place an age limit on the use of such algorithms? Should le-
gal limits be placed on their use in certain spheres? Other issues arise from 
118, 118-19 (2016) (focusing on fairness concerns, from unfair wealth distribution, unfair dif-
ferent treatment, etc.); M Ziewitz, Governing Algorithms: Myth, Mess, and Methods, 41(1) 
SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 3, 5-6 (2016) (concerns include “bias, discrimination, fairness, 
distribution of visibility, surveillance, and accountability”). Some of these issues can be 
solved, at least partially, by computational neutrality. Another issue relates to human decision-
making. Article 22 of the EU General Data Protection Regulation provides that individuals 
generally have the right not to be subjected to decisions that are based solely on automated 
processing, when these are deemed to have a significant effect. Regulation 2016/679, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 17 Apr. 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons 
with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and 
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU).
20. Observe that should the employment of an algorithm not be voluntary, a different 
host of issues arises, which is beyond the scope of this article.
21. See, e.g., OECD, DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION FOR GROWTH AND WELL-BEING:
INTERIM SYNTHESIS REPORT 4 (Oct. 2014). For examples of machine learning already used in 
algorithms, see EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 9.
22. For some of the most notable work on choice architecture, see generally Cass R. 
Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1159, 1160 (2003); Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 
AM. ECON. REV. 175, 179 (2003).
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the construction of preferences23 by algorithms. To wit, in a market in which 
demand is driven by algorithms, can we necessarily regard the choices made 
as expressions of user preferences that serve our socio-political goals? Even 
if the answer is positive—does this new mode of user choice fit current le-
gal assumptions, such as those that apply to the notions of consent or intent? 
And are our regulatory tools, which seek to ensure that individual consum-
ers can make informed decisions, outmoded? It is therefore essential to de-
termine whether the existing legal framework is sufficiently potent to deal 
with this brave new world, or whether we need new regulatory tools.
Despite their importance and timeliness, these questions have not been 
dealt with in depth. This article seeks to fill this void. It proceeds as follows. 
Part II explores the lure and modes of operation of algorithmic assistants, 
and how these characteristics may affect human choice. Part III then analyz-
es the rationales for such choice, and explores how these rationales are af-
fected by the employment of autonomous algorithmic assistants. As shown, 
while some rationales are not harmed—and might even be strengthened—
by the use of autonomous algorithmic assistants, others challenge us to re-
consider the meaning and the role that choice plays in our lives and to deal 
with the conflict between the efficient fulfillment of short-term preferences 
and the long-term ability to form such preferences. Part IV analyzes the im-
plications of these new private orderings on regulation, with a special focus 
on laws based on assumptions of human autonomous decision-making. We 
summarize our findings in a short conclusion.
II. Choice in the Digital World
How do algorithmic assistants affect individual choice? This part of the 
article offers a short note on the technological capabilities, as well as the po-
tential downsides, of algorithmic assistants. It then identifies and analyzes 
four non-exclusive categories of algorithmic assistants, with growing effects 
on choice. Such an analysis is necessary in order to provide a solid basis for 
understanding how algorithms affect human choice.
A. Technological Abilities of Algorithmic Assistants24
Computerized algorithms are structured decision-making processes that 
automate computational procedures to generate decisional outcomes on the 
basis of data inputs.25 The decisional parameters and rules for weighting 
23. We define preferences widely to include also those based on moral, ethical or intel-
lectual values, such as fairness, generosity, or environmental protection. Preferences can in-
clude both short-term desires as well as long-term goals.
24. Largely based on Gal & Elkin-Koren, supra note 9.
25. See, e.g., THOMAS H. CORMEN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS 5 (3d ed. 
2009).
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them can be set by the algorithm’s designer. Advanced algorithms employ 
machine learning, in which the algorithm self-adjusts based on its own anal-
yses of data previously encountered, freeing the algorithm from predefined 
preferences. For instance, based on a consumer’s past actions, an algorithm 
may conclude that the consumer likes to purchase products similar to those 
bought by his close friends, and change the decisional parameters accord-
ingly.
A wide variety of algorithms already help users make choices. At the 
most basic level, algorithms offer information about possible options (e.g., 
Travelocity or Yelp).26 Others narrow down the options, presenting only 
those assumed to be most relevant (e.g., Tinder, Amazon). The new genera-
tion of algorithmic assistants takes such services a step further, making and 
executing decisions for the user by directly communicating with other sys-
tems through the internet. The algorithm automatically identifies a need, 
searches for an optimal purchase, and executes the transaction. Such algo-
rithmic assistants can be employed by both consumers and suppliers, mak-
ing or accepting offers. They can also make decisions that do not involve 
the marketplace, such as how to organize one’s day, who to date, whether to 
take an umbrella, what route to follow to a given destination that would re-
duce CO2 emissions, and how to drive one’s car.
The rise of algorithmic assistants is facilitated and accelerated by the 
advantages they offer over human choice, which are at a level never reached 
before.27 As elaborated below, they enable speedier, more efficient and more 
sophisticated decisions.28 Furthermore, the algorithm’s capacity to perform 
its task is limited only by technology and data; it is never tired, stressed, or 
sick.29 Algorithms can also avoid users’ biases and overcome manipulative 
marketing techniques.30 Given these comparative advantages, large digital 
companies are already competing to become users’ digital assistants.31 Ex-
26. Interestingly, some administrative agencies have also created online comparison 
tools, such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s mortgage calculator. See, e.g.,
Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1275, 1280-85 (2017).
27. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: A REPORT ON ALGORITHMIC 
SYSTEMS, OPPORTUNITY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS (2016).
28. In some markets, such as online financial trading, speed creates an important ad-
vantage. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Law’s Acceleration of Finance: Redefining the Problem of 
High-Frequency Trading, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2085, 2110 (2015).
29. This is not to deny the potential risk of infection with software viruses or malware.
30. For sub-optimal decisions, see, for example, Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Amos 
Tversky, Elimination by Aspects: A Theory of Choice, 79 PSYCHOL. REV. 281 (1972). For a 
discussion of how consumers are affected by visual stimuli, see, for example, Milica Mi-
losavljevic et al., Relative Visual Saliency Differences Induce Sizable Bias in Consumer 
Choice, 22 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 67 (2012).
31. Yadron, supra note 2.
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amples include Google Assistant, Apple’s Siri, and Amazon’s Alexa.32 The 
huge investments involved are based on the assumption that the use of algo-
rithmic assistants will become commonplace and will serve as a main gate-
way to the internet. This does not imply that unassisted human decision-
making will completely disappear. Nonetheless, even users who enjoy deci-
sion-making may prefer to employ algorithmic assistants for the purchase of 
certain products or services, or for other types of decisions.
At the same time, algorithmic assistants may also generate new harms 
and risks. A major potential harm, elaborated below, involves choices that 
do not accurately reflect consumers’ preferences.33 Another potential harm 
is users’ increased vulnerability to the risks associated with the digital 
world, such as risks to privacy and cyber-security. Also, technology can re-
duce our awareness of our actions. Navigation applications which make us-
ers less conscious of their location exemplify this phenomenon. Finally, al-
gorithmic assistants have potentially profound implications for human 
choice, given that the user is at least one step removed from the algorithm’s
decisions. This latter effect is the focus of this article.
B. A Taxonomy of Algorithmic Assistants
The effects of algorithmic assistants on users’ choice depend on their 
design and technological capabilities. Two main dimensions affect the us-
er’s choice: the decision parameters employed by the algorithm, and the 
level of choice which remains at the hands of the user.
We identify four paradigmatic categories of decision parameters used 
by algorithmic assistants, with growing effects on users’ autonomous 
choice.34 In the first category the user sets the exact decisional parameters to 
be used by the algorithm as well as the weight to be given to each one (e.g., 
cost over quality, reliability over speed of delivery). The algorithm then 
chooses among the options it detects in accordance with these preferences. 
We call algorithms in this group “Stated Preferences Algorithms.” In this 
scenario, the algorithm simply serves as the automated and efficient long 
32. These algorithms are designed to perform multiple actions and transactions, beyond 
purchase decisions. An interesting recent example involves Google’s Jarvis, which seeks to 
create a smart home based on the Internet of Things.  See Jessica Guynn, Morgan Freeman to 
Voice Mark Zuckerberg’s Jarvis, USA TODAY (Dec. 21, 2016, 11:31 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/12/20/morgan-freeman-voice-mark-
zuckerbergs-jarvis/95656216/.
33. See infra Section III.B.
34. For a discussion of the various levels of automation that reflect distinct degrees of 
human–machine interaction, see, for example, Argyro Karanasiou & Dimitris A. Pinotsis, A
Study into the Layers of Automated Decision Making: Emergent Normative and Legal Aspects 
of Deep Learning, 31 INT’L REV. OF L., COMPUTERS & TECH. 170 (2017).
Fall 2018] Challenges to Choice 67
arm of the user. The user and algorithm’s choices completely overlap,35 but 
the algorithm enables a more efficient execution of the decision.
In the second category the user chooses the decisional parameters from 
a fixed menu prepared by the algorithm’s designer (“Menu of Preferences 
Algorithm”).36 Such menus—in essence not very different from menus in 
restaurants—generally limit the range of options that can be reached 
through the algorithm, even if products that fit the user’s real preferences 
are available.37 Sites like Travelocity and Airbnb exemplify such menus in 
which the user is limited to a predefined set of parameters from which he 
can choose. While potentially limiting choice, these menus might make the 
decision easier for the user. They can also create economies of scale in the 
analysis and the execution of the transaction by the algorithm, should it be 
employed in parallel by different users, for example if the algorithms can 
then order large quantities of the same product.
The third category is more complex yet more intriguing. In this catego-
ry the algorithm applies decisional parameters which are not (wholly) based 
on the consumer’s stated or chosen preferences. Rather, the algorithm gen-
erates a simulation which attempts to mimic and predict consumer prefer-
ences. We call this group “Predicted Preferences Algorithms.”
The prediction of preferences has become one of the most important 
turfs of competition in the digital world, in which data on users’ past choic-
es and traits is the main currency. While demand predictions were always an 
integral part of the market economy (e.g., producers chose in which news-
paper to advertise in accordance with the predicted preferences of readers), 
recent advancements in data collection and data science have made such 
predictions much easier and more sophisticated. To construct such predic-
tions, data are collected from numerous sources, including the internet, as 
well as the Internet-of-Things via trillions of sensors placed in machines 
connected to the internet around the world.38 The ability to collect data is
35. This proposition is based on the assumption that the user would have invested the 
necessary resources to make the most efficient decision.
36. The difference between the Stated Preferences Algorithm and the Menu of Prefer-
ences Algorithm is largely based on who determines the decisional parameters that limit the 
algorithm’s choices in the first place. In the first category, the user sets the parameters, and 
can thus set them in complete accordance with his preferences, dependent, of course, on the 
algorithm’s technological capabilities. In the second category, the designer sets the parame-
ters, and thus they might not exactly fit those of the user (for example, I also want to give 
weight to the movies shown on the flight, but this is not a parameter I can choose from if it 
was not included by the algorithms’ designer).
37. Attempts to create a more customized menu of choices can be exemplified by 
Google Now’s new feature, “Explore Interests,” which requests users actively input areas of 
interest. See, e.g., Phil Oakley, Google adds Explore Interests to Now with six categories to 
get updates on, ANDROID POLICE (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.androidpolice.com/2016/08/08/
google-adds-explore-interests-now-six-categories-get-updates/.
38. See, generally, OECD, SUPPORTING INVESTMENT IN KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL,
GROWTH AND INNOVATION (2013).
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strengthened by what Professor Noah Harrari has called the “Data Reli-
gion”39 which worships measuring numerous aspects of our lives (such as 
the number of steps we take each day) as well as the sharing and transparen-
cy of data (such as via online social networks),40 and by the willingness of 
many users to share data for a small benefit.41 Sensors which detect users’
physiological reactions to events in real time also provide invaluable data to 
learn about users’ preferences. Such sensors already exist (such as Fitbit), 
and more sophisticated ones are being created. This exponentially fast-
growing honeycomb of data is collected, organized and stored in humong-
ous databases. Rapidly advancing techniques of data science such as pattern 
recognition and machine learning, are combined with traditional tools such 
as statistics to mine valuable information from the data.42 This data analysis 
serves as the basis for the creation of user profiles, which generally act like 
a “digital shadow,” attempting to mimic users’ preferences. The profile is 
based on past revealed preferences (such as that the user has read detective 
novels) which can be combined with the choices of others with relatively 
similar profiles. This, in turn, enables the predicted preferences algorithm 
not only to identify, but also to predict, a user’s future preferences. The al-
gorithm might even identify preferences that users themselves are unaware 
of (e.g., the user believes she prefers healthy food; the algorithm detects that 
she periodically submits to a craving for chocolate). Indeed, data scientists 
argue that algorithms can teach us things we don’t know about ourselves.43
A wide variety of algorithms already use predicted preferences to guide 
users through decision-making processes, such as Amazon’s product sug-
gestions. As Professor Richard Ford puts it, “If I purchase a CD by Britney 
Spears. . . it will recommend Christina Aguilera and other prepubescent 
bleached blondes singing upbeat pop. . . If it’s good enough, I’m likely to 
rely more and more heavily on the selections of the cyber doppelganger and 
39. See Daniel Rubinfeld & Michal S. Gal, Access Barriers to Big Data, 59 ARIZ. L.
REV. 339 (2017).
40. See, generally, YUVAL NOAH HARRARI, HOMO DEUS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
TOMORROW (2016). This trend is further strengthened by the externalities created when only 
some people reveal their information: others may find that they must also disclose private in-
formation to avoid the negative inferences attached to staying silent. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD,
ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 90 (1994); Scott 
R Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus & the Threat of a Full Disclosure 
Future 105 NW. L. REV. 1153, 1156 (2011).
41. See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti et al., What Is Privacy Worth?, 42 J. OF LEGAL 
STUD. 249 (2013).
42. See, e.g., Hal R. Varian, Big Data: New Tricks for Econometrics, 28 J. OF ECON.
PERSP. 3 (2014).
43. See, e.g., Nicholas Thompson, When Tech Knows You Better than You Know Your-
self, WIRED (April 4, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/artificial-intelligence-yuval-noah-
harari-tristan-harris/.
Fall 2018] Challenges to Choice 69
less on my own judgment and the limited information I can gather my-
self.”44
The fourth category of algorithmic assistants, which we call “Paternal-
istic Algorithms,” is a sub-category of the third one and has the largest ef-
fect on choice, making choices for the user which are assumed to be best for 
him overall, even if they clash with his immediate preferences. Such algo-
rithms may purposefully give more weight to long-term preferences over 
short-term ones, and to rational preferences over immediate and emotional-
ly-driven ones. For example, although I’m in the mood to eat pizza tonight, 
the algorithm will order salad, which better fits my current health needs.45
Accordingly, the user employs the algorithm to impose self-restraint upon 
his own choices.
Observe that a choice between algorithms which fall into the different 
categories, in itself, might serve as an indication of the user’s preferences. A 
decision to use a Paternalistic Preferences algorithm signals that the user 
prefers long-term considerations to short-term ones, as long as the user is 
informed of the differences between the different algorithms and they are 
otherwise quite similar (e.g., in their computational powers).
The second dimension which affects users’ choice is the level of control 
over the decision which remains in the user’s hands once the algorithm is 
employed (human-in-the-loop), regardless of which of the four categories 
characterizes the algorithm. At one extreme, all potential options are pre-
sented to the user (e.g., Google Search). Even in this case the choice archi-
tecture, such as which options are presented first, may still affect the user’s
choice.46 Some algorithms narrow down the options for the user, based on 
his digital profile, presenting only those options assumed to be most rele-
vant. Karen Yeung argues that such algorithms create a “hypernudge ef-
fect,” prodding the user to reach a specific decision.47 Other algorithms 
make a choice, which is then subject to the user’s approval. In all the above 
cases, while the algorithm may indirectly influence the choice, the ultimate 
decision is made by the user.
At the other end of the spectrum the algorithm automatically identifies a 
need, searches for an optimal purchase, negotiates and executes the transac-
tion. The user provides second-order consent, waiving his right to choose 
44. Richard T. Ford, Save the Robots: Cyber Profiling and Your So-Called Life, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1573, 1575-76 (2000).
45. See, e.g., Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person, 68 J.
OF PHIL. 5 (1971) which offers a two-level model: first-order and second-order desires.
46. See, e.g., Eric J. Johnson et al., Beyond Nudges: Tools of a Choice Architecture, 23
MARK. LETT. 487 (2012).
47. See Karen Yeung, ‘Hypernudge’: Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by Design, 20 
INFO., COMM. & SOC. 118, 118 (2017).
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directly or even to approve the choice made on his behalf.48 For example, 
consider the following scenario. Sensors are placed in the user’s garden and 
in the fertilizers’ storage area. Data collected from both sources are ana-
lyzed by a specialized algorithm to determine when fertilizer supply is low, 
as well as the actual fertilizing needs of the particular garden. Decisional 
parameters may also include real-time data predicting seasonal weather, 
temporary shortage of certain products, and price changes. Once a choice 
has been made, based on the data analysis, the algorithm automatically 
places an order and arranges for payment and delivery,49 which it can do 
with the assistance of on-line software agents (“shopping bots”).50 It can 
even employ a robot to distribute the fertilizer in the garden. The self-
executing quality of these autonomous algorithmic assistants limits the need 
for human intervention beyond the employment of the algorithm and the ini-
tial placement of the sensors.
Below we focus on algorithmic assistants which are either predicted 
preferences algorithms or paternalistic preferences algorithms. Given the 
way that technology is currently developing and their relative advantages, 
such algorithms are likely to be widely used, at least with regard to some 
decisions. We assume that algorithmic assistants are designed, supplied and 
controlled by external firms. When the algorithm is written or controlled by 
the user, some—though not all—of the effects on user choice analyzed be-
low are mitigated.
C. The Effects of Algorithms on Choice
Autonomous algorithmic assistants affect the act of choice: the user 
chooses to employ the algorithm, and the algorithm then makes autonomous 
choices for the user. The choice of an algorithm might be made by an algo-
rithm which compares algorithms that make final decisions, which, in turn, 
might be chosen by an algorithm which compares among comparison algo-
rithms. Furthermore, an algorithm might set our preferences for the use by 
another algorithm. The user can thus be further removed from his final 
choice.
More importantly, algorithmic assistants may also affect the content of 
the decision made on behalf of the user. This may happen for several rea-
48. See, generally, Dave Wendler, Deception in Medical and Behavioral Research: Is 
It Ever Acceptable?, 74 MILBANK Q. 87 (1996).
49. Jane L. Levere, When a Robot Books Your Airline Ticket, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 
2016, at B6.
50. “Agents could behave autonomously or proactively. The intelligence of an agent 
refers to its ability of performing tasks or actions using relevant information gathered as part 
of different problem-solving techniques such as influencing, reasoning, and application specif-
ic knowledge.” Prashant R. Nair, E-Supply Chain Management Using Software Agents,
COMPUTER SOC’Y OF INDIA COMM. 14 (July 2013).
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sons.51 First, the ability of algorithms to analyze substantially more infor-
mation in a quick, relatively costless and sophisticated way, increases the 
number of possibilities that can be analyzed in a given time or cost frame, 
thereby increasing the number of options.
Second, when the weight to be given to different decisional parameters 
cannot be exactly specified by the user, and the algorithm’s choice is based 
on machine learning analysis of the user’s past choices, some level of un-
predictability is almost always built into the system. This is partly because 
humans often are not aware of the exact weight they give to each decisional 
parameter they use and often cannot quantify their preferences. For instance, 
how might one quantify the potential increase in positive feelings and crea-
tivity that would accrue from writing with the exact same pen used by Al-
bert Einstein? This, in turn, implies that an algorithm’s choice cannot al-
ways be predicted by the user.
Third, algorithms can reduce consumer biases that negatively affect his 
welfare.52 Even in the case of stated preferences algorithms, the user might 
not include decisional parameters that might have otherwise affected his de-
cision (e.g., the color or font size used on the product’s packaging). In both 
the predicted preferences algorithms and paternalistic algorithms, biases are 
likely to be given little weight, if any, in the decision parameters used, un-
less the algorithm’s designer considers them part of the user’s preferences 
and he is able to recognize such biases in the first place.53 In all cases, the 
user need not be aware of such biases.
51. Arguments that algorithms affect choice are not new. In the past such arguments 
centered on the fact that algorithms affected choice by showing each user the exact same re-
sults. The advent of user profiling has changed the content of the choices as well as the argu-
ments raised.
52. For consumer biases see, for example, Benjamin E. Hilbig, On the Role of Recogni-
tion In Consumer Choice: A Model Comparison, 9 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 51 
(2014) (biases based on name recognition); Ming Hsu & Carolyn Yoon, The Neuroscience of 
Consumer Choice, 5 CURRENT OP. IN BEHAV. SCIS. 116, 118 (Oct. 2015) (biases based on 
product placement). For a survey of the literature on biases regarding the Free Effect—by
which consumers value a free product more than its actual worth, see Michal S. Gal & Daniel 
Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: Implications for Antitrust Enforcement, 80 
ANTITRUST L. J. 521, 528 (2016). Observe, however, that not all biases are necessarily wel-
fare-reducing.
53. If we look far enough into the future, this problem might also have a technological 
solution. For example, the grey box may appear to us to be colorful if we look at it through 
our virtual reality glasses. Alternatively, our personal robot will open the package in our ab-
sence. For the ability of algorithms to limit biases, partly based on the analysis of data which 
indicates inefficient correlations in our decision-making, see, for example, FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OF EXCLUSION? (2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion-
understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf.
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Fourth, algorithms limit the cognitive overload that might have prevent-
ed the user from making an efficient choice.54 Once the user is occupied by 
one decision, he might have less capacity to make another decision in an ef-
ficient manner. Furthermore, an abundance of choice might lead people to 
make bad choices or to not choose at all.55 An algorithm does not suffer 
from such limitations, up to the extent of his technological capacities.
Fifth, algorithms may change the user’s choice by overcoming manipu-
lative marketing techniques which play on people’s vulnerabilities to affect 
their thinking, emotions, and behavior.56 For instance, an algorithmic assis-
tant will not end up buying the chocolate stacked near the cashier just be-
cause it cannot fight temptation while waiting in line. In our digital world, 
this may create an important advantage since, as Ryan Calo argues, ad-
vancements in big data significantly increase the potential for digital market 
manipulations.57
Sixth, the use of algorithmic assistants could create incentives for sup-
pliers to create a greater diversity of products in order to serve customers’
exact preferences, thereby increasing consumer choice. Finally, paternalistic 
algorithms may at least partially remedy a widespread criticism of human 
choices: that individuals adopt preferences not because they serve their in-
terests, but because these preferences were shaped by social and economic 
conditions.58 Acknowledging such preferences, the designer of the algorithm 
might instead give more weight to considerations which actually serve the 
user’s interests. Indeed, algorithmic assistants provide a market-based tech-
nological solution to some of the major problems that currently plague hu-
man choice.
At the same time, algorithmic decisions might be based on incorrect as-
sumptions embedded in the code by the designer (such as the user always 
reads the same type of books) or arising from the algorithm’s data analysis 
(such as incorrect consumer profiling).59 Indeed, if we assume that choice is 
based on multiple variables that resist a straightforward or even determina-
54. See Evan Selinger & Thomas P. Seager, Digital Jiminy Crickets, SLATE (July 13, 
2012, 6:33 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2012/07/ethical-decision-making-apps-damage-
our-ability-to-make-moral-choices.html.
55. See, e.g., BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS
(2004).
56. See Robert Epstein, The New Mind Control, AEON (Feb. 18, 2016), https://aeon.co/
essays/how-the-internet-flips-elections-and-alters-our-thoughts (providing examples of ma-
nipulative marketing techniques and describing the way search engines affect users’ percep-
tions).
57. Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulations, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1006-18
(2014).
58. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
59. See, e.g., Solon Barocas et al., Governing Algorithms: A Provocation Piece, (Mar. 
29, 2013), http://edshare.soton.ac.uk/8849/31/48-Governing-Algorithms.pdf; Langdon Win-
ner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121 (1980).
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ble reduction to a predetermined decision tree,60 then algorithms cannot al-
ways correctly predict human choice. Rather, humans often possess hetero-
geneous preferences which may come into conflict. Some choices might 
even be deliberately suboptimal from an efficiency point of view, but still 
increase the user’s utility.61 Furthermore, even if the algorithm recognizes 
and attempts to follow a user’s behavioral pattern, what happens when that 
pattern includes a completely different choice made occasionally? How will 
the algorithm establish when precisely to introduce the new, spontaneous 
element and change the user’s previously determined preference?
Moreover, choices made by the algorithm might be more self-
perpetuating and path-dependent than human choices would otherwise be.62
This is because past choices serve as signals for future ones, and also be-
cause if the user is not exposed to other options, then his predicted choices 
will most likely not change in the future. Furthermore, once the algorithm is 
employed by many users, mistaken assumptions embedded in the code can 
be multiplied. This could lead to limited demand for some welfare-
enhancing products resulting from such mistakes.
So far we have disregarded third-party interests, assuming that algo-
rithms simply seek to further the user’s welfare. As Ariel Ezrachi and Mau-
rice Stucke elaborate, in reality, algorithmic choices might also be affected 
by the interests of third parties.63 Providers of algorithms, as well as firms 
which enjoy significant power in a market controlling a resource which is 
necessary for the operation of the algorithm, might have incentives to 
change users’ choices in order to fit their own underlying interests or be-
liefs, thus generating systematically skewed decisions.64 A provocative ex-
ample involves Facebook’s alleged attempt to push upwards more liberal 
news without user’s knowledge.65 Competition among algorithms may re-
duce this effect, as can information about an algorithm’s decision parame-
ters.66
60. See, e.g., Manuel Vargas, If Free Will Doesn’t Exist, Neither Does Water, in
EXPLORING THE ILLUSION OF FREE WILL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 177 (Gregg D. Caru-
so ed., 2013).
61. Morris Altman, Freedom to Choose and Choice X-Inefficiencies: Human and Con-
sumer Rights, and Positive and Normative Implications of Choice Behavior, 68 REV. SOC.
ECON. 395, 399-400 (2010).
62. See, e.g., BAROCAS ET AL., supra note 59, ¶ 33.
63. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 9.
64. These concerns resonate with critiques which highlight how powerful internet in-
termediaries, such as Google, act as critical gatekeepers. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Beyond 
Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries,
104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 121 (2010) (exploring the regulation of search engines); Yeung, su-
pra note 47, at 123-24.
65. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 9, at 198.
66. See id. at 202; Gal & Elkin-Koren, supra note 9, at 20-21.
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This raises the following question: why would users choose an algo-
rithm that does not always make optimal decisions for them? Several factors 
come into play. For one, the user might be unaware of the algorithm’s ef-
fects on choice due, inter alia, to the limited transparency of the algorithm 
and its “black box” quality. A user who is unaware of the algorithm’s limi-
tations, would likely not be aware of choices he has forgone. Such a market 
failure would be very difficult to fix, as users cannot be expected to exercise 
oversight when dealing with unknown unknowns. Alternatively, users may 
find it increasingly difficult—or not worth their while—to exercise over-
sight over sophisticated and opaque systems.67 Indeed, as algorithms be-
come more complicated and sophisticated, even their designers might not 
completely understand the algorithm’s decisional parameters.68 These limi-
tations can be partly reduced if transparency of the algorithm is required69 or 
if a secondary market is created for tools for explaining the decisions of and 
comparing algorithms. Thirdly, the overall choices made by the algorithm 
may still be better than other options, including making decisions without an 
algorithm. This is especially true for those instances in which an algorithm 
serves multiple tasks which cannot be separated, most of which it performs 
well.70 Finally, as Maurice Stucke and Alan Grunes note, the tyranny of the 
majority can dictate the choices of the minority: if you want to join an ap-
plication and benefit from its network effects, you must accept the terms it 
offers.71 In some cases, however, deference to human choices (e.g., the user 
may direct the algorithm to choose a historic novel today) may limit such 
vulnerabilities.
In short, not only the act of choice is affected by the use of autonomous 
choice algorithms, but also the content of the choice.  The digitized artificial 
67. See, e.g., Christian Sandvig et al., Auditing Algorithms: Research Methods for De-
tecting Discrimination on Internet Platforms (May 22, 2014), http://social.cs.uiuc.edu/papers/
pdfs/ICA2014-Sandvig.pdf; Karanasiou & Pinotsis, supra note 34, at 182-83.
68. See, e.g., Zeynep Tufekci, We’re Building a Dystopia Just to Make People Click on 
Ads, TED (Sept. 2017), https://www.ted.com/talks/zeynep_tufekci_we_re_building_a_
dystopia_just_to_make_people_click_on_ads/transcript#t-9834 (“We no longer really under-
stand how these complex algorithms work. We don’t understand how they’re doing this cate-
gorization. It’s giant matrices, thousands of rows and columns, maybe millions of rows and 
columns, and not the programmers and not anybody who looks at it, even if you have all the 
data, understands anymore how exactly it’s operating”). For the effects of computational 
complexity on the transparency of the algorithm see also Karanasiou & Pinotsis, supra note 
34, at 182.
69. For such suggestion see, for example, FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX
SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015); D. 
K. Citron & Frank A. Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process For Automated Predictions,
89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 10-11, 24-25 (2015); Zarsky, supra note 19, at 121. Transparency is a 
limited tool, however, with regard to algorithms based on deep learning. See Karanasiou & 
Pinotsis, supra note 34, at 183.
70. See, e.g., Yadron, supra note 2.
71. MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION POLICY 
168 (2016) (writing on privacy conditions).
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hand supplements the invisible natural hand of the market. Table 1 summa-
rizes the different effects on human choice created by the four types of algo-
rithms.
Table 1: The effects of Algorithms on User’s Choices
Algorithm/User’s
Actions
Stated 
Preferences
Menu of 
Preferences
Predicted 
Preferences
Paternalistic 
Preferences 
User choosing to 
employ a certain  
algorithm
+ + + +
User defining the 
decision 
parameters
+ + (partially) - -
Algorithm 
Limiting 
behavioral biases
+
(indirectly)
+ (indirectly, 
>)
+ (directly, 
>>)
+ (directly, 
>>>)
Algorithm’s
Nudge qualities
- + > + >> + >>
Algorithm 
Increasing the 
number and 
quality of 
choices
+ + + +
Algorithm’s
overall effects on 
the user’s choice
+ + > + >> + >>>
III: The Role of Autonomous Choice
As we have established, algorithms can significantly affect users’
choices. We turn now to the rationales on which human choice is based. We 
then explore whether these rationales hold true for choices made by auton-
omous algorithmic assistants which are voluntarily employed by users. Our 
analysis also seeks to explore which challenges to autonomous choice are 
inherent to the use of algorithmic assistants, and which can be solved by 
technological means.
A. Rationales for Promoting Autonomous Choice
Ideally, autonomous human choice is assumed to be made by a mentally 
competent, fully informed individual, through a process of rational self-
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deliberation.72 The centrality of such self-determination is based on ration-
ales that come from diverse fields, including economics, psychology, epis-
temology, metaphysics, the cognitive sciences, and political philosophy. Be-
low we explore in broad strokes three main rationales for autonomous 
human choice, namely efficiency, psychological effects, and liberal political 
theory.73 Some of these are consequentialist, focusing on the direct results of 
autonomy, and some are deontological, giving value to autonomy regardless 
of its consequences. These theories sometimes complement each other. For 
instance, the theory of utilitarianism is sufficiently wide to include psycho-
logical rationales for human choice that do not necessarily lead to the most 
objectively efficient choices.
We do not to argue that autonomous choice is more important than oth-
er values. Yet given its centrality in our society and our legal system, tech-
nologies that significantly affect autonomy should be analyzed, so that those 
who value autonomy can evaluate it in light of its effects.74 Accordingly, we 
seek to analyze the direct effects of algorithmic assistants on our choices, as 
well as on our preference formation abilities which, in turn, affect our 
choices in the long-run, that is, when sub-optimal choice according to a cer-
tain criteria nonetheless increases people’s well-being.
1. Efficiency Rationales
One of the most important assumptions underlying the promotion of 
human choice is that individuals know better than anyone else what is best 
for them.75 Therefore, the decisions they make are likely to be best from 
their point of view.76 This rationale focuses on the result of the act of 
choice, rather than on the act itself. It is important to emphasize that the ef-
ficiency rationale is based on the assumption that human decisions maxim-
ize an individual’s subjective preferences, rather than what an outsider 
might think he should prefer.
72. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 131 
(1969). In this article we assume that free choice exists, at least to some extent. Observe that if 
we assume that no free will exists, and that all choices are predetermined, then the analysis 
below is redundant. We also define autonomy to include acts reflecting consent to external 
inputs or inducements.
73. Given that the use of algorithmic assistants is generally voluntary, we do not relate 
to those justifications for autonomy that arise when choice is involuntarily limited, such as 
respect for one’s demand to make his own choices which is part of one’s dignity. See, e.g.,
Stephen Darwall, The Value of Autonomy and Autonomy of the Will, 116 ETHICS 263 (2006).
74. See Benkler, supra note 18, at 41.
75. See Gordon R. Foxal, The Behavior Analysis of Consumer Choice, 24 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 581, 582 (2003). The Kantian tradition also holds this view. See, e.g., Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 892-93 (1994) (showing that the 
Kantian tradition treats autonomy as a super-value, in the sense that, “because rational, auton-
omous agents” find these values worth pursuing, all values are worth pursuing).
76. Foxal, supra note 75, at 582.
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The efficiency rationale is fraught with inherent limitations, such as the 
fact that individuals do not always make the best choices for themselves, 
whether because they are subject to biases and fallacies or because they give 
too much weight to short-term considerations.77 In addition, individuals may 
not possess all the relevant information necessary to make the best choice 
for themselves, especially in the digital world,78 or they may not be able to 
overcome collective action problems.
2. Psychological Rationales
Psychological rationales for autonomous choice generally focus on the 
psychological values inherent in the act of choice itself, regardless of the 
efficiency of the result. One argument centers on the connection between 
choice and identity. Conscious and subconscious conceptions of identity are 
shaped through choice, offering us opportunities to define and enhance our 
self-image, and to create personal meaning and responsibility. The act of 
choice also enables us to critically explore, reflect upon, and reform our 
preferences. The result of the act of choice can also affect one’s identity.
The effect can be direct; to illustrate, the choice of a book or newspaper can 
affect a person’s views and values.79 It can also be indirect, affecting one’s
self-image and personality through the reactions of others to his choices. 
Such social reactions, including (in)attention to and (non)appreciation of 
one’s choices, can also affect one’s well-being.80
77. See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1541-42 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2000).
78. For some information limitations of consumers see, for example, Omri Ben-Shahar, 
The Myth of the ‘Opportunity to Read’ in Contract Law, 5 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 1, 7 (2009); 
Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding Scale Approach 
to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 30 (2012); Robert A. Hillman, Online Boiler-
plate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 837, 840–41 (2006); Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity 
and the Waning of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1231–32 (2006).
79. See, e.g., Patti M. Valkenburg, Jochen Peter, and Joseph B. Walther, Media Effects: 
Theory and Research, 67 ANNUAL REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY 315 (2016). A similar line of 
arguments was made by C. Edwin Baker, An Economic Critique of Free Trade in Media 
Products, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1357, 1389 (2000) (arguing that the media market not only ex-
presses preferences, but shapes them). For an argument that algorithms shape culture see, for 
example, TARLETON GILLESPIE, #trendingistrending: When Algorithms Become Culture, in 
Algorithmic Cultures: Essays Of Meaning, Performance and New Technologies, in 
ALGORITHMIC CULTURES: ESSAYS ON MEANING, PERFORMANCE AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES
(Robert Seyfert & Jonathan Roberge, eds., 2016).
80. See, e.g., Asle Fagerstrøm et al., Implications of Motivating Operations for the 
Functional Analysis of Consumer Choice, 30 J. ORG. BEHAV. MGMT. 110, 113-14 (2010).
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Choice may also strengthen one’s knowledge and recognition of the 
world and the objects in it which, in turn, affect our conceptions.81 Further-
more, exercising choice, at least in some spheres, may itself be a source of 
pleasure. Indeed, some researchers argue that consumer choice has become 
an opiate for contemporary society, since consumption and consumerism 
offer immediate gratification, compensating for discontents arising from the 
lack of control over many aspects of life.82 The act of choice may also create 
a deeper level of engagement in one’s life and choices, thereby strengthen-
ing motivation, responsibility, productivity and healthy functioning.83
At the same time, choice can also create psychological burdens which 
result from the act of choice itself as well as from internal dilemmas of 
whether we made the right choice,84 and from a cognitive overload arising 
from too many options or too much information.
The psychological effects explored are not equally strong for all the
choices one makes. Some choices create much weaker psychological effects 
than others (such as which fertilizer to buy), and differences exist between 
the way individuals psychologically react to choice.
3. Liberty Rationales
Autonomous choice is an important part of the liberal political tradi-
tion’s concept of human beings as free, equal and rational, in control of their 
own life.85 Under this rationale, the act of choosing, in itself—not just hav-
ing the ability to choose, or enjoying the objects of our choices—is intrinsi-
cally valuable. As John Stuart Mill famously argued, a person’s “. . .own 
mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in it-
self, but because it is his own mode.”86 Accordingly, acting as an autono-
81. This argument is partly based on the theories of phenomenology (how experience 
shapes our consciousness) and empiricism (a branch of epistemology which assumes that 
most of our knowledge is experience or experiment-based rather than predetermined).
82. Yiannis Gabriel, Identity, Choice and Consumer Freedom – the New Opiates? A 
Psychoanalytic Interrogation, 15 MARKETING THEORY 25, 28-29 (2015).
83. See Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-Regulation and the Problem of Hu-
man Autonomy: Does Psychology Need Choice, Self-Determination, and Will?, 74 J.
PERSONALITY 1558 (2006).
84. See Elizabeth Nixon & Yiannis Gabriel, ‘So Much Choice and No Choice At All’: A 
Socio-Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Consumerism as a Source of Pollution, 16 
MARKETING THEORY 40, 47-49 (2016) (illuminating the discomfort and anxiety which fol-
lows many consumers in the shopping process).
85. See John Kleinig, Human Rights, Legal Rights and Social Change, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS 36 (Eugene Kamenka & Alice Erh-Soon Tah eds. 1978).
86. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 53-71 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ’g
Co., 1978) (1859). See also BERLIN, supra note 72 (“[T]he word ‘liberty’ derives from the 
wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend
on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not 
of other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by 
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mous decision-maker is not only good in its own right; it is also part of what 
makes the objects of our choices valuable to us and our way of making life 
our own. A life containing goods and pleasures which one has not in fact 
chosen would therefore appear alienated and incomplete.87 But even if the 
choices we make do not achieve all these benefits, the ability to make our 
own choices is valuable in itself.
Some clarification may be in order, as the concept of autonomy used 
here should be distinguished from other, related moral values. Speaking 
about autonomy, people sometimes confuse two uses of this concept. The 
first is autonomy as a sort of capacity. Under this understanding, one is au-
tonomous to the extent that one has the capacity to decide for oneself, or the 
ability to be the author of one’s own life. The second is autonomy as an 
achievement: actually deciding for oneself, the actual authoring of one’s
own life. In this sense, to be autonomous is to act autonomously.88 The for-
mer sense parallels the conceptually neighboring idea of freedom. Freedom 
is a capacity rather than its exercise. It consists in either the ability to act 
without external restraints or interference (negative freedom), or the ability 
to act on one’s authentic or rational will (positive freedom).89 Either way, a 
person may be entirely free to choose a course of action without ever exer-
cising that freedom of choice.
Under the latter conception of autonomy, protecting and promoting per-
sonal autonomy requires more than the securing of freedoms.  Freedom is of 
course a necessary condition. A person cannot choose without having free 
and acceptable choices. But autonomy can be compromised even if freedom 
is not: a life lived passively, without active choices being made, is not an 
autonomous one. And it fails to be autonomous no matter how elaborate 
one’s freedom of choice is, or how developed her mental capacities for ra-
tional deliberation.90
Moreover, these considerations suggest a possible hierarchy between 
the freedom to choose or capacity for choice, and the actual exercise of that 
conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from out-
side. I wish to be . . . a doer—deciding, not being decided for . . . .”).
87. For a development of this view see, for example, Lee A. Bygrave & Jens Petter 
Berg, Reflections on the Rationale for Data Protection Laws, in 25 YEARS ANNIVERSARY 
ANTHOLOGY IN COMPUTERS AND LAW 3, 32 (Jon Bing & Olav Torvund eds., 1995) (“[T]he 
interest in non-automated decision making . . . embodies a concern for personal integrity, and 
ultimately a concern for human dignity.”); GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE 
OF AUTONOMY (Sydney Shoemaker ed., 1988); Robert Young, The Value of Autonomy, 32 
PHIL. Q. 35, 43 (1982). See also Ronen Perry & Tal Z. Zarsky, “May the Odds Be Ever in 
Your Favor”: Lotteries in Law, 66 ALA. L. REV. 1035, 1062 (2015).
88. This distinction has been made famous by JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF 
FREEDOM 372-73 (1986).
89. For the distinction between negative and positive freedom, see BERLIN, supra note 
72, 118-72.
90. Cf. RAZ, supra note 88, at 204.
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freedom or capacity of choice. Arguably, it is the exercise of choice that ul-
timately matters. The point of providing free choice and nourishing capaci-
ties is, at least in part, in the hope that these capacities will be put to good 
use. As Joseph Raz notes, it is “the value of the exercise which endows the 
capacity with what it is worth.”91 This self-authorship is the concept of au-
tonomy which underlies political liberal theory: the individual is required to 
engage in the act of choice, regardless of whether it leads to objectively op-
timal choices for him.
Obviously, choices are never completely unlimited: options are often 
affected by natural limitations, as well as the actions and choices of others, 
be it the state or other individuals. Choices are also pervasively shaped by 
the surrounding environment including technological artifacts, which shape 
the relationship between humans and their world and the way they perceive 
and understand themselves.92 From the liberal viewpoint, this, by itself, is 
not problematic, so long as choices are not artificially limited.93
B. How the Rationales Are Affected by Algorithmic Assistants
Let us now explore how these rationales are affected by choices made 
through algorithms. To make our case as strong as possible, we focus on an
algorithm which endeavors to serve only the user’s welfare, and which 
makes an autonomous decision once the user chooses to employ it. In doing 
so, we attempt to unravel the “choice paradox” identified above.
1. Efficiency Rationales
In those instances in which the algorithm reaches the same decision as 
the user, but simply in a more efficient way, the efficiency rationale for hu-
man choice does not stand.
The more interesting cases are those in which the algorithm significant-
ly alters the user’s choice. To determine the applicability of the efficiency 
rationale in these cases, one must explore the reasons for such altered choic-
es.
As elaborated above, altered choices often reflect the comparative ad-
vantages of algorithms relative to users, either because the use of algorith-
mic assistants leads suppliers to create better choices for consumers, or be-
cause it allows for a more efficient choice among the available options.94
Research on consumer choice has also shown that while people tend to base 
91. Id. at 372.
92. See John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Jan 9, 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/. For 
an overview of internal and external limitations on autonomy, see Benkler, supra note 18, at 
35-37.
93. See RAZ, supra note 88.
94. See supra Section II.
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their significant decisions on rational considerations, smaller decisions are 
often made impulsively and are not economically rational.95 This, in turn, 
might lead to a stronger justification for using algorithms for small choices.
The algorithm can also bring about strength in numbers. First, the algo-
rithm could create buyer power, either through the creation of a strong buy-
ing platform operated by one algorithm, or through coordination among 
several algorithmic consumers.96 Generally, the stronger the buyer power, 
the greater the benefits from the transaction that can potentially be passed 
on to the user. Strong algorithmic consumers might also (partly) counter the 
market power of suppliers. This is especially true with regard to small con-
sumers, who could not otherwise easily protect themselves against such 
market power.97 Second, the algorithm could create positive network effects. 
For example, where a similar decision by all users implies that their welfare 
would be reduced (e.g., everyone using the same road at times of heavy traf-
fic), the algorithm might suggest an outcome that is best for all by directing 
some drivers to alternative roads. Third, the aggregation of users under an 
algorithm could reduce the ability of suppliers to discriminate among us-
ers.98 This is because once users are aggregated into sufficiently large 
groups, suppliers lose the ability to collect information on users’ individual 
preferences with regard to the products bought through the group, and to 
discriminate among them based on each user’s elasticity of demand. This, in 
turn, might increase at least some users’ welfare.99 Finally, the algorithm 
could be designed to overcome collective action or negative externality 
problems (e.g., by giving more weight in the decision process to considera-
tions such as buying from firms using green energy). It could also increase 
competition by taking into account long-term competition considerations, 
for instance by buying some portion of a certain good from new entrants in 
order to ensure they can grow in the market, thereby increasing overall effi-
ciency in the long-run.100
Overall, where the choices made by the algorithm reflect its compara-
tive advantages over users’ choices, the efficiency rationale for human 
choice does not hold. Put bluntly, human choice is not a necessary constitu-
ent of efficient decisions.
95. See Klaus Wertenbroch, Self-Rationing: Self-Control in Consumer Choice,
(INSEAD, Working Paper No. 2001/63/MKT, 2001), https://ssrn.com/abstract=296954.
96. Gal & Elkin-Koren, supra note 9, at 23.
97. See Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Re-
tail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1324-25 (2015). Yet buyer power can sometimes have negative 
effects on welfare. See, e.g., Gal and Elkin-Koren, supra note 9.
98. See, e.g., Samuel B. Hwang & Sungho Kim, Dynamic Pricing Algorithm for E-
Commerce, in ADVANCES IN SYSTEMS, COMPUTING SCIENCES AND SOFTWARE ENGINEERING
149 (Tarek Sobh & Khaled Elleithy eds., 2006).
99. Gal & Elkin-Koren, supra note 9, at 23.
100. Id. at 22.
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Yet, as elaborated above, even an algorithm which strives to serve only 
the user’s preferences might not always accurately reflect such prefer-
ences.101 Microsoft’s experience with its ChatBot provides an intriguing ex-
ample. In 2016 Microsoft released a ChatBot called Tay.ai, designed to in-
teract, inter alia, with Twitter users and send tweets based on such 
interactions. A day afterwards Microsoft had to deactivate the account, due 
to a large amount of offensive commentary by the ChatBot, which simply 
mimicked other tweets, and which clashed with Microsoft’s preferences re-
garding the content of its ChatBot’s tweets.102 This example illustrates some 
of the problems involved in basing one’s preferences on following the con-
duct of others. In addition, the fact that an algorithm makes the user’s deci-
sions—even if he chose to employ it—might reduce the user’s sense of re-
sponsibility to such choices, therefore creating some negative externalities. 
This detachment might be strengthened if the decision to employ an algo-
rithm is itself made by another algorithm.
Users are thus vulnerable to algorithms’ limitations. Given these limita-
tions, does the efficiency rationale lead to human choice?103 The answer may 
still be negative, depending on the circumstances. As noted above, in order 
to be efficient, the decision of the algorithm need not be optimal, only better 
than104 the decision the user would have reached without the algorithm, 
when taking into account all the factors involved (including the time saved). 
The answer also depends on whether users can differentiate between those 
instances in which algorithms are beneficial and those in which they are not. 
Yet even if users cannot differentiate between these cases, should they be 
aware of the algorithm’s limitations they can choose not to employ algo-
rithms—or at least not to do so without some overriding mechanism which 
enables them to exercise their own discretion—in those decisions where the 
risk to them of an inaccurate choice is high (e.g., choosing a business part-
ner). The market could also provide a partial solution in the form of internal 
indicators of accuracy (such as what is the expected rate of uncertainty) or 
algorithms that compare the accuracy of algorithms.
Let us now briefly relate to a world in which algorithmic assistants are 
not benign. Here, of course, the efficiency rationale for human choice might 
be much stronger, given that the algorithm’s decision would not strive to 
101. Id. at 15.
102. Sarah Perez, Microsoft Silences Its New A.I. Bot Tay, After Twitter Users Teach It 
Racism, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 23, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/03/24/microsoft-
silences-its-new-a-i-bot-tay-after-twitter-users-teach-it-racism/.
103. A simplistic argument provides that the mere fact that users continue to use such 
algorithms is an indication of their positive welfare effects. While this is true to some degree, 
it does not take into account factors such as information problems and nudging effects that 
may explain such use.
104. Users might define a better choice in different ways. For a partial discussion see 
supra Section II.C.
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serve only the interests of the user. The ability to prevent such algorithmic 
decisions depends, inter alia, on the user’s ability to realize, in real time, 
that the algorithm does not serve (only) his interests. The black-box quali-
ties of some algorithms—and especially those based on machine learning—
increases information asymmetries and reduces the ability of the user to 
separate those actions which serve his interests from those which do not. 
Yet even in such cases the overall effect on efficiency is not straightfor-
ward. For example, the efficiency rationale for human choice would not 
hold in cases where the algorithm’s functions cannot be separated, and 
where most of its decisions, including those that carry the most value to the 
user, are substantially more efficient than they otherwise would be.
To verify the overall efficiency of employing autonomous algorithmic 
assistants, it is also important to analyze the externalities they create on oth-
er markets and decisions. If, for example, the algorithm increases the market 
power of existing digital platforms, which, in turn, block new innovation, 
then these considerations should not be disregarded.105
In addition, and more importantly, there is a certain worry that our ca-
pacity for decision-making could suffer. By willingly allowing ourselves to 
be continuously subjected to algorithmic decisions in return for the highly 
tailored convenience and efficiency which they appear to offer, we may be 
slowly but surely eroding our capacity for internal processes of self-
deliberation, as well as self-creation and development, that enable us to 
form preferences.106 This argument likens our decision-making capacity to a 
muscle that needs to be exercised, in order to stay in shape. Furthermore, the 
increased usage of algorithms by others limits one’s ability to deliberate and 
learn from others’ experience with regard to the parameters that determine 
their choices. Finally, the user’s ability to learn from mistakes may suffer if 
the user is not aware of all the parameters that led to the algorithm’s
choice—especially when the algorithm is a black-box—and especially if he 
is not aware of those options that were not chosen and how they compare to 
those that were. Should these effects impair the ability of users to make effi-
cient decisions in other spheres of their lives, then this negative externality 
should also be taken into account in considering the effects of using algo-
rithmic assistants on reaching efficient decisions.
At the same time, algorithmic assistants can create positive externalities 
on other decisions. Research has shown that decisions deplete individuals’
internal resources of will-power and decision-making.107 Accordingly, once 
we defer some decisions to algorithms, we can make better decisions in oth-
105. For similar considerations see, for example, EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 9 at 
29-31.
106. See generally, JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF (2012) (sup-
porting the claim that people need to develop their autonomy in a process of self-formation).
107. See, e.g., ROY F. BAUMEISTER & JOHN TIERNEY, WILLPOWER: REDISCOVERING 
THE GREATEST HUMAN STRENGTH 90-93 (2011).
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er spheres. This is because the algorithm’s will-power is not finite and it 
will make the same decision late at night, after a day full of decision-
making, that it would have made early in the morning. Overall efficiency 
may thus arise if one chooses correctly which decisions are better deferred 
to algorithms. In addition, by saving time on some decisions, one can spend 
more time making other decisions. Finally, by observing the choices that 
algorithms make—even if the user does not understand all the factors that 
came into play—the user can indirectly learn to make better choices in other 
spheres.
So far we have focused on the individual’s efficiency. Total efficiency 
considerations add another important dimension to the analysis. Most deci-
sions made by algorithms—especially those regarding regular consumption 
goods or services—may generally increase total efficiency. Some excep-
tions exist. To illustrate, should deference to algorithmic decision-makers 
indeed erode people’s capacity for processes of self-deliberation, our politi-
cal institutions might suffer if citizens are less able to make sound decisions 
in exercising their democratic rights.108 This negative effect can be com-
pounded by digital “echo chambers” strengthened by the use of algorithms, 
in which the information one receives simply echoes one’s views, thereby 
indirectly limiting his ability to change his mind. While individuals may 
prefer such echo chambers, and regard them as subjectively efficient, their 
overall societal effect on democracy might be negative. Also, the use of al-
gorithms may sometimes increase discrepancies in society, if they benefit 
some groups at the expense of others. This may happen, for example, where 
algorithms are not benign.
2. Psychological Rationales
The psychological effects of algorithmic assistants are ambiguous. On 
the one hand, freeing users from the need to engage in some otherwise bur-
densome decisions may increase their well-being. As Barry Schwartz ar-
gues, the multiple choice economy we live in today might paradoxically re-
duce happiness.109 Indeed, at least in some spheres users may have a 
preference that decisions be made by others. The fact that interactive mov-
ies, in which the viewers choose the endings have not succeeded as well as 
their creators have hoped, might serve as an indirect indication of this ten-
dency.
A related argument is that more free time may increase innovation and 
creativity. Apple Inc.’s founder, Steve Jobs, provides an interesting exam-
108. See Antoinette Rouvroy & Yves Poulett, The Right to Informational Self-
Determination and the Value of Self-Development: Reassessing the Importance of Privacy for 
Democracy, in REINVENTING DATA PROTECTION? 45, 46 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2009).
109. Barry Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice, YOUTUBE (Jan. 16, 2007), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=VO6XEQIsCoM.
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ple: he wore the exact same clothes every day. This enabled him to limit the 
choices he had to make on what he considered to be mundane issues, and 
keep his energies for more creative ones.110 It is noteworthy that the im-
portance of the connection between the use of algorithms and creativity ex-
tends beyond its direct psychological effects on the user. This is because we 
may define ourselves not only through our autonomous choice, but also 
through other means such as our creativity.111
Choices made by the algorithm, which reflect the user’s preferences, 
can also contribute to the user’s happiness. As Richard Ford puts it, “if we 
have given up autonomy, it was only the autonomy to make poor choices, 
go to bad restaurants with people we turn out not to like much, buy boring 
novels, listen to ear splitting music, engage in activities where costs out-
weigh benefits. I am actually more free now than ever before because my 
true self—the self that labored under misconceptions, limited information 
and emotional noise—is now facilitated by powerful and benevolent tech-
nology.”112 Moreover, some psychologists argue that people’s ability to pre-
dict the effects of future events on their happiness is remarkably inaccu-
rate.113 Algorithmic assistants have the potential to reduce this problem.
On the other hand, it is not obvious that users would necessarily be 
happier—or have a stronger sense of self-fulfillment—in a world in which 
most everyday decisions were performed by algorithms. First and perhaps 
foremost, employment of the algorithm could reduce people’s ability to de-
fine themselves through their choices. The user’s identity will instead be 
shaped by the choices made through the algorithm, producing beliefs, goals, 
perceptions, and interactions other than those which would have been creat-
ed by the individual making choices in an unmediated way. If an algorithm 
chooses the clothes I wear, the food I eat, and the books I read, on what ba-
sis do I fashion my identity? As Ford notes: “Over time, one could say that 
rather than the computer profile reflecting my tastes, I reflect its tastes. Of 
course, the profile started out trying to be as much like me as it could. So in 
one sense, the computer has simply helped me to be a better me—one that 
develops with the benefit of more information and more sound reasoning 
than I would have had on my own.”114 Also, if choices shape one’s identity, 
the algorithmic tendency towards path dependency on the user’s past choic-
110. See WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 362 (2011). For the reduction of choice of 
clothing as a method to reduce decision fatigue, see John Haltiwanger, The Science of Simplic-
ity: Why Successful People Wear The Same Thing Every Day, ELITE DAILY (Nov. 14,  2014) 
https://www.elitedaily.com/money/science-simplicity-successful-people-wear-thing-every-
day/849141.
111. This idea is reflected in the concept of homo faber—man as creator.
112. Ford, supra note 44, at 1578-79.
113. See DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 24-25 (2006).
114. Ford, supra note 44, at 1577.
86 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 25:59
es can inhibit unconscious changes to the user’s identity that would have 
otherwise occurred.
These effects can also completely change our existing social percep-
tions and interactions: What kind of signals could one use to enable others 
to know who he really is? If others know that some of my choices were 
made by algorithms, but do not know which ones—partly because such 
transparency would be hard to implement—how would they react to my 
choices? Alternatively, choices that do not mimic the user’s preferences can 
affect the social reaction to him, in a way which is detached from his real 
identity. Also, if users do not know or understand the parameters underlying 
decisions made on their behalf, feelings such as fear of missing out and of 
not controlling one’s life might increase.
Another point to consider is what consumers would do with the time 
freed up by algorithms. Would the result actually be increased innovation 
and creativity, or would it be laziness and complacency—and if so, what 
would be the consequences of such a change for the individual and for soci-
ety?115 Also, how would people be affected by loss of the social interactions 
that are often a by-product of shopping? Furthermore, psychological exper-
iments have shown that many of our choices are based on opinions and in-
formation gathered from family, friends and acquaintances.116 Such sharing 
of information serves a social function, beyond any efficiency considera-
tions, which might be lost when algorithms make choices for us. In addition, 
people may feel less self-fulfilled if they do not “own” their choices. Put 
differently, the joy that comes from knowing you studied the options and 
made the right choice, or that you learned from mistakes, will decrease once 
decisions are made by algorithms. Finally, research has shown that some 
people enjoy the act of choosing, even when the choice is not easy.117
The matters raised here are beyond our expertise, but our intuition sug-
gests that the effects of autonomous algorithmic assistants on users’ well-
being may not all be positive, even if our lives are more efficient and the 
“correct” decisions are made.118 The balance between the above considera-
tions may differ based on the type of choice to be made, the overall number 
of choices delegated to algorithms and their importance to the user, the abil-
ity of others to differentiate between choices made by the user and those 
made for him by an algorithm, and the user’s personal characteristics. Ac-
115. Ryan & Deci, supra note 83, at 1564 (noting that undermining autonomy and 
choice might injure performance and creativity especially when it requires flexible, heuristic, 
creative or complex capacities).
116. See, e.g., STUDIES IN DECISION MAKING: SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND SOCIO-
ECONOMIC ANALYSES (Martin Irle & Lawrence B. Katz eds., 1982); ROBERT E WITT, GROUP 
INFLUENCE ON CONSUMER BRAND CHOICE 53 (1970) (demonstrating strong correlation be-
tween knowledge of peer choce and individual choice).
117. Ryan & Deci, supra note 83, at 1576 
118. This is a complicated issue. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 109.
Fall 2018] Challenges to Choice 87
cordingly, while the psychological rationales for delegating some decisions 
to algorithms are strong, this unquestionably does not hold true for all deci-
sions and all users.
3. Liberal Theory Rationales
As elaborated above, liberal political theory emphasizes the autonomy 
of the self: that is, not only the capacity and freedom to reach one’s own de-
cisions, but the supreme importance of actually doing so. Such autonomy 
should be based on a freedom of choice. The use of algorithmic assistants 
may affect freedom and autonomy in different ways.
Consider freedom first. Positive freedom requires that people be able to 
act on their authentic will. It can be argued that deferring to algorithms is 
generally compatible with positive freedom. The voluntary and informed 
decision to implement the algorithm is, in itself, an act of choice. As Rich-
ard Ford puts it: “Remember, it’s all voluntary, I don’t have to accept any of 
the suggestions offered by my cyber doppelganger. If the suggestions aren’t 
good for me, I can reject them; if I really don’t like the idea of taking direc-
tion from a computer on general principle, I can resist.”119 According to this 
view, it is limitations on our ability to use algorithms—rather than our vol-
untary and willful use of them—which harms positive freedom.
Furthermore, algorithms supply technological tools for making choices 
based on one’s digital shadow. In other words, the algorithm is designed to
mimic users’ true preferences, thereby enabling users to more optimally ful-
fill their preferences. Under this view, the algorithmic assistant is simply the 
efficient, long arm of its user. Furthermore, if, as Isaiah Berlin suggests, a 
person’s positive freedom consists in liberation from occasional passions, 
information limitations and biases, and if a free choice is one that conforms 
to one’s higher, more rational self—to what one would choose in one of her 
better moments, as it were120—then freedom may in fact be better served by 
algorithms. Paradoxically, our digital assistants might be able make deci-
sions that are truer to our authentic selves—truer even than the decisions we 
would in fact make on our own. Therefore, one’s self does not disappear, 
but rather is embodied in the algorithm.
Algorithmic assistants raise an interesting question in this regard: to ex-
ercise positive freedom, must the user be aware of his self-inflicted limita-
tions on choice, in particular the technological limitations of the algorithm 
and the parameters used by it to make the choice? Put differently, can a ra-
tional or authentic choice be made if one is not aware of the factors that play 
into the decision made on his behalf? This issue is, of course, most relevant 
to “black box” algorithms. A potential response is that it is sufficient that 
119. Ford, supra note 44, at 1576.
120. BERLIN, supra note 72.
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the user recognizes and accepts his unawareness, so long as he believes that 
the algorithm is indeed attempting to further his own preferences. As noted 
above, the market also has an important role to play here, in creating some 
sort of signaling system to guide users to their best choices. Greater trans-
parency can also reduce this problem, although, as Barocas and Nissenbaum 
suggest, a “transparency paradox” may arise: providing the level of detail 
needed to enable users to provide genuinely informed consent would over-
whelm even savvy users because the decisional parameters are volatile and 
indeterminate.121
The effect of algorithmic assistants on positive freedom is, therefore, 
dependent on their ability to reflect the user’s true choices as well as on the 
awareness if the user of the parameters used to make the choice. Let us re-
member that true choices are not necessarily the optimal choices that one 
could make, but those that best reflect the user’s preferences at the time of 
the decision, which may include the pursuit of immediate pleasures, desires 
and passions. In decisions which fall into the latter category, in which the 
user actually wishes to be true to himself even if the decision is not an ideal 
one, positive freedom will be harmed to the extent that algorithms are not 
able to reflect and realize such choices. There is also a certain worry that 
our capacity for decision-making would suffer even without positive free-
dom being limited, due to a limited exercise of decision-making by the indi-
vidual, as elaborated above.
On the concept of negative freedom, which requires that one be able to 
act without external restraints or interference, algorithms once again create 
mixed results. On the one hand, their technological capabilities allow us to 
overcome external restraints, such as countering supplier power, limiting the 
ability of suppliers to engage in price discrimination, and opposing suppli-
ers’ manipulative selling techniques.
On the other hand, they could potentially threaten our ability and liberty 
to choose. One potential argument relates to the technological limitations of 
the algorithm, which are reflected in and restrain their choices. Yet in our 
view this argument should generally be rejected as an indication of harm to 
negative freedom, at least when the user is aware of the algorithm’s limita-
tions and still voluntarily chooses to employ it.
A more convincing argument relates to situations in which algorithmic 
assistants possess significant market power which, in turn, affects the con-
tent of their choices in a way which does not serve the user’s interests.122 To 
illustrate, consider the following example, which relates to the dominance of 
a handful of extraordinarily powerful transnational companies in a global 
121. Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Big Data’s End Run Around Anonymity and 
Consent, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT
44, 59 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014).
122. See discussion supra Section II.B.
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networked market for digital services. The comparative advantages of algo-
rithmic assistants are often tied to their ability to access and analyze data 
relating to a user’s preferences, in order to better mimic his preferences. Ac-
cordingly, data-driven network effects have the potential to increase entry 
barriers, strengthening platforms which have better access to vast amounts 
of data and their algorithmic assistants, and weakening the ability of inde-
pendent algorithmic assistants to compete in the market.123 This process is 
part of what Shoshana Zuboff calls “surveillance capitalism,” in which 
power is identified with ownership of the means of behavioral modifica-
tion.124 Yet note that such abuses or manipulations are not unique to algo-
rithmic assistants and can be reduced by some regulatory tools.125
Finally, negative freedom could be indirectly reduced when the choice 
not to employ an algorithm might be costly in the marketplace. For exam-
ple, some sellers might offer a discount for users of algorithmic consumers. 
As algorithms become more efficient, some industries might indeed require 
some reliance on their decision-making powers, thereby reducing the free-
dom of users to decide whether to employ them.
The greater, more immediate concern created by algorithmic assistants 
to autonomy seems, however, to be the harm to the act of choosing itself. 
The concern is that autonomy is realized through the act of making choices, 
and if we delegate this responsibility to an algorithm we ipso facto relin-
quish that autonomy (though we retain our capacity for autonomy, which is 
a different matter, as discussed above). While we may have many options 
open to us, the choice among them is not made by the individual based on 
self-reflection and self-deliberation that lead to the shaping and application 
of his preferences, but rather through an algorithm which is assumed to be 
able to mimic these preferences. Note that this concern of harm of autono-
my pertains even to the most benign algorithm conceivable, one which 
makes recommendations which exactly mirror the user’s preferences. In-
deed, the concern might in fact be graver in that case, because of the great 
temptation to rely on such algorithms. Algorithms offer a trade-off of sorts: 
autonomy is a price paid—freely and willingly—for superior capacity for 
want satisfaction and convenience.
It is important not to overstate the case. Autonomy is one value among 
others. This means that deference to algorithms may sometimes be worth 
the price we pay in personal autonomy. For example, if an algorithm could 
improve our accuracy in diagnosing terminal disease and offering adequate 
treatment, the importance of saving lives would surely be more pressing 
than the medical staff’s interest in exercising their autonomous decision-
123. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 9, at 191–92 (describing how algorithmic assis-
tants can create an anticompetitive effect).
124. Zuboff, supra note 12, at 81.
125. One such tool is antitrust law.
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making.126 Some scholars go further and do not treat such limitations as 
harming autonomy. Joseph Raz, for example, argues that individual auton-
omy and authority do not come into conflict when the authority is used to 
service the individual. This may happen when the authority can better per-
form tasks that the individual would have performed, or when it overcomes 
collective action problems.127 Gerald Dworkin suggests that decisions to 
limit choice in order to fulfill a greater goal do not necessarily make a per-
son less autonomous. The examples he provides are voluntary army service 
and monasticism. 128
Furthermore, while writing our own life story is of high value, do we 
have to color between the lines, or can we simply draw the bold ones and 
delegate some of our decision-making powers to others? It can thus be ar-
gued that the act of choice is at least partly exercised by such delegation, or 
by the choice we make of which algorithm to employ, especially if the user 
is aware of the parameters used by the algorithm to reach the decision. Fur-
thermore, it can be argued that enabling the existence of a rich repertoire for 
the act of choosing—including choosing yourself or choosing by employing 
different algorithms—can sometimes induce more meaningful choice.129 Yet 
to be autonomous one must identify with one’s choices, and own them.130
The question thus arises whether we will feel committed to our choices once 
they are made by algorithms.
This leads to another observation: there are spheres of life in which 
choosing is more important than arriving at the optimal outcome. For exam-
ple, it might be ill-advised to use an algorithm to choose one’s partner, no 
matter how superior the algorithm’s “taste.” It is also more difficult to justi-
fy the use of an algorithm in deciding whether to use lethal force in war-
fare,131 or in political voting. Most cases would fall somewhere between 
these extremes. Furthermore, autonomy is not a dichotomous concept, and 
partial autonomy can also further the liberal theory rationale, at least to 
some extent. The thing to bear in mind is that our reliance on algorithms for 
decision-making, even when generally justified, has a cost. To the extent 
126. For a discussion of cases somewhat analogous to this see David Enoch, A Defense 
of Moral Deference, 111 J. OF PHIL. 1, 14 (2014).
127. Joseph Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, 68 THE MONIST 295 (1985).
128. GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 18 (Sydney 
Shoemaker ed., 1988).
129. For a similar argument with regard to contractual freedom see Hanoch Dagan, Au-
tonomy, Pluralism and Contract Law Theory, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2013, at 
19-20.
130. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369 (1988).
131. For a discussion see, for example, Eliav Lieblich & Eyal Benvenisti, The Obliga-
tion to Exercise Discretion in Warfare: Why Autonomous Weapon Systems are Unlawful, in
AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS: LAW, ETHICS, POLICY 245 (Nehal Bhuta et al. eds., 
2016); ARMIN KRISHNAN, KILLER ROBOTS: LEGALITY AND ETHICALITY OF AUTONOMOUS 
WEAPONS 33-61 (2009).
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that our autonomous way of living is worth caring about, this is a cost to be 
reckoned with.
To conclude, the use of algorithmic assistants can be at least partially 
justified by the rationales that support autonomous human decision-making. 
Algorithms can often reach more efficient choices; they can increase one’s
well-being, at least in some cases; and they do not necessarily clash with 
liberal political theory rationales. Yet these rationales do not hold for all de-
cisions. Rather, some decisions are best made by individuals. Such deci-
sions may differ from one individual to another, depending inter alia, on 
their effects on one’s well-being (e.g., for one person it might be a choice of 
clothes and for another the book he reads), the accuracy of one’s digital 
shadow, and the absolute number of other decisions made by algorithms. 
They can also depend on the subject matter of the decision (buying tomatoes 
is not the same as political voting). This implies that while algorithmic as-
sistants may enjoy significant comparative advantages over autonomous 
human choice in many decisions, advantages which would most likely grow 
with the advent of improved methods to determine human preferences and 
create digital shadows, autonomous-choice rationales may still justify au-
tonomous decision-making in some instances. Most importantly, the use of 
algorithmic assistants should not harm one of the basic conditions for au-
tonomous decision-making, namely the ability of the individual to form 
preferences on which he can base his decisions, at least in those spheres of 
life in which he chooses not to employ an algorithm. The next chapter ex-
plores the legal implications of our findings.
IV: Legal Implications of Changes in Autonomous Choice
It is only a matter of time before algorithmic assistants become com-
monplace. Their advent raises a host of intriguing legal challenges. In this 
part we seek to shed light on those of challenges that result from the effects 
of algorithmic assistants on autonomous human choice. We first explore 
whether the use of algorithmic assistants should be allowed in light of their 
effects on human autonomous choice. We then explore whether our regula-
tory tools should be recalibrated or rewritten in order to deal effectively 
with the new challenges to autonomous choice. Our goal is not to provide 
definitive answers for the myriad issues that arise, but rather to identify and 
map them. Observe that other regulatory challenges, relating to other as-
pects of the employment of algorithmic assistants, which are beyond the 
scope of this article, may also arise.
A. Should the Use of Algorithmic Assistants be Allowed?
One question focuses on whether we should allow the market to take its 
expected course, or whether some limitations should be placed on the use of 
algorithmic assistants due to their effects on autonomous human choice. In 
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light of the conclusions reached in Part III above, several observations are in 
place. First, we counsel against blanket restrictions on the use of algorithmic 
assistants. Not only do algorithmic assistants offer many benefits, but, as 
shown above, at least with regard to a subset of decisions their use does not 
significantly clash with justifications for autonomous human choice and it 
sometimes even furthers them. Moreover, banning their use creates the 
“choice paradox” identified above, as it limits users’ freedom to voluntarily 
employ such algorithms in order to aid them in making choices. This is 
strengthened by the fact that in many situations the correct balance between 
the autonomy to choose to employ algorithms and the autonomy to make 
one’s own choices is not clear, and interventionary regulation can limit the 
benefits to be had.  Finally, at least in some areas such a ban would be diffi-
cult to implement—both realistically and theoretically—if the use of algo-
rithmic assistants was allowed elsewhere around the globe, creating com-
parative advantages for their users or enabling users to employ algorithms 
located outside their jurisdiction.
At the same time, some steps should be taken to ensure that algorithmic 
assistants’ potential negative effects on user’s choice are accounted for and 
justified. One major tool involves the support of market conditions that in-
crease the incentives and the ability of providers of algorithmic assistants to 
increase user’s utility.132 Competition in the market for the supply of algo-
rithmic assistants, as well as in the market for tools that compare the per-
formance of algorithmic assistants, can potentially improve the quality of 
algorithms, and strengthen the incentives of providers of algorithms to en-
sure that the limitations they impose on human choice are justified. Compe-
tition in the market for inputs necessary to create or to operate algorithmic 
assistants can increase the ability of algorithmic assistants to operate effi-
ciently.
Antitrust is an especially potent tool to advance such market conditions, 
as it strives to ensure that competition in the market is not limited by artifi-
cial barriers. To illustrate, a merger among producers of algorithmic assis-
tants should be prohibited if it would significantly limit competition among 
algorithms, thereby indirectly limiting users’ choice, without creating offset-
ting benefits for users. Another example involves the vertical integration of 
algorithmic assistants with suppliers of products necessary to create or to 
operate efficient digital shadows, such as data.133 Control over sensors might 
be especially important, as sensors supply data that enables their controllers 
to observe users’ conscious and unconscious behavior in the real world. For 
example, they might be able to monitor users’ eye movements, heart rate 
132. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 9, at 202; Gal & Elkin-Koren, supra note 9, at 
2.
133. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 9, at 195-96; Gal & Elkin-Koren, supra note 9, 
at 29.
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and tone of voice when users are exposed to certain products or ads. To en-
sure that no artificial barriers are created for competition among algorithms, 
regulators must recognize the unique characteristics of the relevant markets 
in order to deal with them effectively.
An interesting question that arises is whether, in considering the merits 
of a potential action by a designer or provider of an algorithmic assistant 
(such as a merger, joint venture or agreement with another market player), 
antitrust authorities should take into account the limitations that the algo-
rithm places on users’ autonomous decision-making. We suggest that the 
answer is negative. Antitrust authorities do not possess the necessary exper-
tise and tools, nor the democratic mandate, to evaluate such effects and to 
balance them with competing considerations. Observe that while antitrust 
authorities have expertise in analyzing how market dynamics affect the 
choices open to consumers, their analysis largely takes as given that more 
choice implies increased consumer welfare. This does not imply, of course, 
that other regulators, who might possess expertise in such matters, cannot or 
should not take such factors into account. For example, education experts 
might weigh in on whether and to what extent to allow the use of algorith-
mic assistants by school children.
Increased competition cannot ensure, however, that algorithmic assis-
tants are only employed where their harms to autonomous choice are offset 
by benefits to individual and social welfare. There are several reasons for 
this. First, individual decisions to employ algorithms cannot always be as-
sumed to further the user’s long-term welfare. As noted above, this may re-
sult from a combination of factors, including collective action problems, 
bounded rationality, limited information regarding the long-term effects of 
using algorithms, and prioritization of short-term benefits over future harms. 
Moreover, and arguably more important for regulation, the employment of 
algorithms cannot be assumed to always increase social welfare. This is be-
cause private decisions fail to take into account the externalities they impose 
on others. Social interests are thus not adequately accounted for in a system 
based solely on private decisions about whether and when to employ algo-
rithms. This conclusion serves as a call for exploring the possibility to limit 
the employment of algorithms in some cases.
Information about the effects of algorithms can play an important role 
in self-regulation. Accordingly, it is suggested that the public be educated in 
the benefits of autonomous choice at least with regard to some decisions, as 
well as in the potential benefits and limitations of algorithmic assistants, in 
order to create such digital literacy. Exercises that emphasize the differences 
between the two modes of decision-making can be promoted, as should the 
development of a competitive market for tools used for comparing algo-
rithms and for comparing the decisions of algorithms with those of humans. 
In addition, it is important to emphasize the importance of exercising one’s
decision-making power, at least in some spheres of one’s life, in order not to 
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lose this ability. Such efforts would help ensure that users are informed of 
the costs and benefits involved in the decision to employ algorithmic deci-
sion-makers in different spheres of their lives. It does not ensure, of course, 
that users will make long-term efficient decisions. This may result, inter 
alia, from the fact that the ability to make sound decisions is one of long-
term experience, while most decisions to employ algorithms involve short 
term benefits, and people tend to favor immediate benefits over future 
costs.134 Interestingly, a technological solution can partially reduce this 
problem: an algorithm will determine which decisions and how many are 
best made by the user himself.
A difficult question arises whether, in light of the above, the use of al-
gorithms should be prohibited—or at least limited—to certain classes of po-
tential users. In particular, should children, who have not had much experi-
ence in exercising their “preference forming muscle,” be allowed to use 
algorithmic assistants extensively. Children who are not exposed to a varie-
ty of options and are required to choose among them will have more limited 
abilities to select the option that best fits their preferences in the future. As 
Yochai Benkler observes, in such cases the children’s ability to exercise au-
tonomy in the long-term is harmed.135 This question has both normative and 
practical aspects. At this point in time, we suggest that no such governmen-
tal restrictions be imposed, given that to our knowledge most algorithmic 
assistants are currently generally not made for use by children. Nonetheless, 
parents should be encouraged to limit the usage of algorithmic assistants by
children, at least in some spheres. Also, studies on the effects on children of 
the use of algorithmic assistants should be performed, and parents should be 
informed of their results.
In addition, regulatory limitations should be placed on the use of algo-
rithmic assistants where significant negative externalities might otherwise 
be created. This is strengthened by the fact that users are not always aware 
of or can minimize the unanticipated negative results of their use of algo-
rithms. One tool to further this goal is to require some level of transparency 
from the algorithm’s provider with regard to the algorithm’s potential ef-
fects on the user as well as on third parties, at least with regard to some 
types of algorithms. Observe that such transparency, which resembles cau-
tionary information regarding the use of medicine, is different from the type 
134. See ALESSANDRO ACQUISTI & JENS GROSSKLAGS, What Can Behavioral Econom-
ics Teach Us About Privacy?, in DIGITAL PRIVACY: THEORY, TECHNOLOGIES, AND
PRACTICES 363, 372 (Alessandro Acquisti et al. eds., 2008).
135. See Benkler, supra note 18, at 40 (using the example of Amish elders who remove 
their children from public school exactly at the age when they believe that education would 
most influence their children’s preference-formation process and make them more able and 
likely to choose a life other than as members of their community). Note that our case is more 
complicated, given the Choice Paradox.
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of transparency usually suggested for algorithms, which relates to their code 
and data sources.
Furthermore, the use of algorithmic assistants should be limited in those 
spheres in which it is clear that the harm to autonomous choice cannot be 
justified by the benefits that algorithmic assistants bring about. This justifi-
cation can be particularly strong where the use of an algorithmic assistant 
imposes strong negative externalities on others and clashes with our social 
contract.136 For example, in our view algorithms should not be allowed to 
choose senate members in a democratic society. Interestingly, even Isaac 
Asimov, in his known story “Franchise” about the all-knowing Multivac 
computer, did not completely eliminate the need to involve citizens in elec-
tions (although the decision involved input from one representative individ-
ual who provided the final bit of needed data).137 We do not argue that algo-
rithms can never make better political choices. Rather, our suggestion is 
grounded in the externalities political appointment decisions impose on so-
cial welfare. Should citizens prefer that important decisions that affect them 
as a collective be taken by humans, based on self-reflections on their con-
victions, then algorithmic decisions on such matters clash with those citi-
zens’ preferences, thereby indirectly negatively affecting their wellbeing 
and infringing the social contract on which a democratic society is based. 
Note that this suggestion goes beyond each individual’s claim for his own 
individual autonomy, and is based on a demand that others in society exer-
cise their autonomous choice in a sub-set of decisions which impose exter-
nalities on others. Our argument does not prevent individuals from making 
up their own mind by using algorithms.
Finally, we suggest that in order to respect the user’s decision-making 
autonomy, algorithms should generally be mandated to include a “stop but-
ton” which enables users to override the algorithmic mechanism at any 
stage in the decision-making process.138 At the very least, the providers of 
algorithmic assistants should be required to make available a compatible 
version of their algorithm which includes such a function. External regula-
tion is needed because it cannot be guaranteed that market conditions will 
136. To illustrate, the use of algorithmic assistants by consumers to find the best deal 
while harming suppliers they bought from in the past is legitimate. This is because part of our 
conception of the market rules is economic Darwinism: that these suppliers should compete 
more effectively and if not, exit the market. They have no established right that consumers 
will continue to buy from them.
137. Isaac Asimov, Franchise, IF: WORLDS OF SCIENCE FICTION, 5-6 (August 1955).
138. This idea partly resembles requirements for human-in-the-loop of algorithms in 
some areas like health informatics. While these requirements are usually included to protect 
third parties from decisions in which the algorithm’s performance can benefit from knowledge 
or understandings that human intervention adds, here we suggest their application in order to 
protect the autonomous choices of users. Observe, however, that some decisions might take 
the algorithm a fraction of a second. In such cases, the only option that might be viable to the 
user is to overturn the decision.
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always lead to the development of stop buttons in all relevant markets, es-
pecially if the algorithm is combined with other functions that make its 
overall use attractive, and the transaction benefits the algorithm’s provider.
B. Regulatory Challenges of Algorithmic Decision-Making
Assuming that the use of algorithmic assistants is permitted in most 
spheres of our lives, the question arises whether our existing regulatory 
tools are sufficient to deal effectively with this technological change. In par-
ticular, we ask whether the fact that the user is one-step removed from the 
decision and thus does not make a direct autonomous choice, should affect 
the interpretation and application of existing laws or lead to the creation of 
new laws. This is the focus of the analysis below. In particular, we identify 
three major cornerstones of the law that go to the heart of human autono-
mous choice—namely assent, intent, and the protection of conditions for 
exercising one’s freedom of choice (negative freedom)—and inquire how 
they should be applied when choices are made by algorithms.139 Reevaluat-
ing existing legal standards in light of automated decision-making is essen-
tial for social welfare, as otherwise we might discourage the adoption or 
patterns of use of welfare and growth-enhancing technologies.140 Alterna-
tively, it might create a problem of moral hazard which can lead to exces-
sive and socially harmful risk-taking. The importance of setting efficient le-
gal rules that accommodate decisions made by algorithms increases in step 
with the delegation of more tasks to algorithms.
1. Assent
Assent is a major cornerstone of many laws. In contract law, for exam-
ple, the conscious, objectively manifested agreement to contractual terms is 
a critical element of a contract.141 This condition is necessary in order to en-
sure that the contract expresses the choices of its parties. Assent also plays a 
critical role in other areas of law, including antitrust, constitutional rights, 
tort (such as informed consent to medical procedures), and privacy.142 In the 
139. Of course, other questions may also arise. For example, if an algorithm creates a 
new invention, who qualifies as the inventor under patent law? See Ryan Abbott, I Think 
Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079, 
1114-16 (2016).
140. Regarding patterns of use consider the following: A business can create and operate 
its own algorithm, or contract-out its design and operation. Even when the former option is 
otherwise efficient, the latter might be adopted if it reduces the risk of legal liability for the 
algorithm’s actions, and such risk is sufficiently high.
141. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION 45-46 (1981); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 269, 319 (1986).
142. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Con-
sent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1894 (2013) (writing about privacy).
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previous section we dealt with the question of whether agreement to use al-
gorithms should be the sole factor which determines whether their use 
should be permitted. This section focuses on whether and how the user’s as-
sent to the algorithm’s decisions can be inferred.
How does the fact that a decision is reached by an algorithm affect the 
meeting of minds? Arguably, the contract is the result of the user’s volun-
tary and deliberate decision to employ a certain algorithm and to allow it to 
make decisions for him. Therefore, a straightforward answer is that once the 
algorithm is set in motion by the user, it acts as the user’s long arm.143 In-
deed, current contract law presumes that algorithms are mere tools which 
execute the will of their users directly.144
This assumption may be problematic with regard to some algorithms. In 
particular, when using predicted choice and paternalistic algorithms, which
have the ability to learn, thereby divorcing critical aspects of decision-
making in contractual agreements from conscious determination by any in-
dividual,145 the user may not be aware of all the possible choices that can be 
made by the algorithm, let alone keep track of all the parameters that the al-
gorithm considers on his behalf.146 Indeed, this knowledge gap is a direct re-
sult of the algorithm’s comparative advantage: as elaborated above, the al-
gorithm can quickly consider a breadth of data that no human could, and it 
can sometimes predict the user’s future choices better than the user himself.
Furthermore, in some situations the user may not care about the actual 
choice made by the algorithm, so long as it makes a choice. A recent and 
provocative example involves the Random Darknet Shopper, a shopping bot 
used in an art project displayed at a gallery in St. Gallen, Switzerland, in 
2015. For the duration of the exhibition, the artists sent the bot to shop on 
the dark web, with a weekly budget of $100 in bitcoins. The bot chose items 
and sent them to the artists by mail, without the artists knowing in advance 
what would be purchased. The orders were then displayed in the gallery.147
The problem, as Lauren Scholz argues, is that such algorithms stretch to 
its breaking point the requirement of assent, far beyond the intents and ca-
pacities of the algorithms’ authorizing entities.148 The manifested intent to 
143. See Lauren Henry Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 128, 165 
(2017). See also Peter M. Asaro, A Body to Kick but Still no Soul to Damn: Legal Perspec-
tives on Robotics, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS
169, 178-80 (Patrick Lin et al. eds., 2011).
144. Scholz, supra note 142 at 132.
145. Id.
146. See generally, id.
147. Items purchased by the bot included 10 ecstasy pills, a baseball cap-mounted hid-
den camera system, and a fake Louis Vuitton handbag. The exhibits were seized by authorities 
after the exhibition closed. Mike Power, What Happens When a Software Bot Goes on a 
Darknet Shopping Spree?, GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2014/dec/05/software-bot-darknet-shopping-spree-random-shopper.
148. See Scholz, supra note 142, at 132-33.
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use an algorithm to set contractual terms is not the same as objectively, 
manifestly assenting to the actual contract the algorithm reaches. If the in-
structions given to an algorithm are vague (such as find me the best deal), 
the instructions cannot be said to reflect the level of objectively manifested 
assent necessary to ground a contractual promise. The user assent to be 
bound was not made at a sufficient level of specificity which is necessary to 
form an enforceable contract.149
To solve this problem, Scholz suggests that algorithms be regarded as 
constructive agents for the purpose of contract formation.150 Agency law al-
lows one to impute knowledge and intent to principals who are not directly 
involved in tasks, including forming contracts. Principals can authorize their 
agents formally, by implication, or by ratification, i.e., accepting the bene-
fits of the acts of the agent. In agency law, the principal is usually liable for 
the mistakes the agent makes; this is because the principal assumed such a 
risk by opting to use an agent in the first place. Observe, however, that even 
under agency law the principal cannot be assumed to agree to any action 
taken by the agent, and much depends on the level of knowledge required. 
Also, as Karanasiou and Pinotsis argue, the fact that the algorithm can take 
informed decisions with no user’s involvement in the decision-making pro-
cess or even in the goal-setting process, challenges the assumptions on 
which the current concept of agency is based, which relate causality and in-
tent.151 We might thus need to reevaluate existing doctrines of agency law, 
including the assumptions on which they are based, in light of technological 
challenges, and verify that they serve us well in their current form.
2. Intent
The fact that the algorithm engages in autonomous decision-making, 
which is one-step removed from the user but initiated by him, also raises is-
sues regarding the user’s mental state, ranging from recklessness, through 
negligence and intent, to specific intent. One’s mental state is central to 
many areas of law, including criminal law and tort law. The question is 
therefore whether and when a user, who employs an algorithm that creates 
harm to another or to society, is legally responsible for that harm.152 Two 
sets of interconnected issues arise. The first takes existing requirements for 
liability as a given and explores when a user can be found to meet these re-
quirements. The second explores whether new legal tools are needed in or-
149. Id. at 155.
150. Id. at 132.
151. Karanasiou & Pinotsis, supra note 34, at 180.
152. Of course others may be responsible as well, including the algorithm’s designer or 
supplier. These question are not relevant to this article.
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der to effectively deal with the new realities created by algorithms. We 
briefly consider both, focusing on tort law.153
Let us first differentiate between two extreme cases: one in which the 
user could and should have known about the significant risk to others or to 
society involved in the use of the algorithm, and another in which the user 
was not and could not have been reasonably aware of such risk. Both are 
clear-cut cases: while the former generally fulfills the requirement for a 
mental state, the latter does not. Yet most cases fall in-between these two 
extremes.
The issue of a mental state is especially relevant in the case of machine 
learning algorithms. Such algorithms are designed to achieve a given goal. 
They can do so by independently determining the means to reach that goal, 
through self-learning and the reactions to its actions. In such cases the deci-
sion is not the fruit of explicit human design but the outcome of evolution, 
self-learning and independent machine execution.154 Proof of the required 
mental state in such situation—unless strict liability is applied—is not sim-
ple.155 On the one hand, the user chose to use the algorithm, and could have 
checked with the algorithm’s provider whether a harmful or an illegal result 
might arise. On the other hand, once we demand that the user acquaints 
himself with the algorithm’s potential risks and when they might occur, 
some of the benefits of using algorithms (saving time and effort, etc.) might 
be lost. Moreover, even if the user is aware of a potential risk created by the 
algorithm, he might not be cognizant of other market conditions which cre-
ate the actual harm. Such harm would depend on factors not necessarily un-
der the user’s control, and which could change over time.156 Furthermore, 
the algorithm’s designers and providers might be in a better position to im-
prove its quality and better assess its potential risks. Finally, where the algo-
rithm generally improves the prevention of harm relative to human decision-
making, this fact should be given weight.157 We therefore suggest that the 
user’s awareness of the potential harmful effect should not be simply in-
ferred from his decision to use to algorithm, at least in the absence of gross 
negligence, and that strict liability not be applied. Where the user is demon-
strably aware of the potential for harm, the fact that a sophisticated system 
containing an autonomous algorithm performed the actual harmful act
153. Note that similar questions arise with regard to the proof of an agreement among 
algorithms. See, e.g., Gal & Elkin-Koren, supra note 9, at 44.
154. Id. at 22-25.
155. See Yesha Yadav, The Failure of Liability in Modern Markets, 102 VA. L. REV.
1031, 1034 (2016) (noting that the liability framework governing securities trading is unable 
to effectively deter and compensate harms in algorithmic markets. The framework of (i) in-
tent; (ii) negligence; and (iii) strict liability is ineffective in markets that rely on algorithms for 
trading).
156. Gal & Elkin-Koren, supra note 9, at 14-16.
157. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 16, at 18-19.
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should not prevent establishing a mental state.158 Furthermore, a rule should 
be developed to determine the level of awareness we expect from the user. 
Such a rule should balance considerations such as the effects of the expected 
level of awareness on the technological design as well as the use of algo-
rithms, and the expected harm to others.
Algorithms may also affect the level of duty of care. As Ryan Abbott 
argues, the “reasonable person” might potentially be replaced with a “rea-
sonable algorithm” standard, at least where the use of algorithms is relative-
ly easy and commonplace, and where it creates a much lower level of risk 
than comparable human decision-making.159 This implies that the standard 
may be higher than before.
The second set of questions is wider, and explores whether current 
rules, which were created for human interactions, should similarly apply to 
the actions of algorithmic assistants. Suggestions have been made to recog-
nize some types of autonomous algorithms as legal persons,160 making so-
phisticated autonomous algorithms the subject of specific rights and obliga-
tions, including that of making good any damage they may cause. In our 
view, this is a problematic notion that inappropriately limits the liability of 
the designer, provider and user, and blurs the boundaries between algo-
rithms and men.161
Others have suggested strict and vicarious liability for the algorithm’s
actions: If the algorithm’s designer did not sufficiently inform users of any 
dangers associated with the use of the algorithm, or if the algorithm was de-
fective, the responsibility will lie with the designer. Otherwise, responsibil-
ity will lie with the user. This, in essence, is strict liability for failure to su-
pervise by effective oversight.162 Along this line, the European Parliament
recently issued a draft proposal for dealing with autonomous robots which,
in essence, are sophisticated algorithms.163 It recognized that the ordinary
158. Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence: When Computers Inhibit 
Competition, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1775, 1798.
159. Abbott, supra note 16, at 39-41.
160. See generally Tom Allan & Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts?, 9
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 25 (1996); SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY 
FOR AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS 153 (2011); F. Patrick Hubbard, “Do Androids 
Dream?”: Personhood and Intelligent Artifacts, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 405 (2011) (noting that 
human artifacts should be afforded legal rights if they meet certain criteria). See also F. Pat-
rick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”: Balancing Liability, Regulation, and Innovation, 66
FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1863 (2014) (noting that no legal personhood suggested to artefacts).
161. European Parliament Comm. on Legal Affairs, Draft Report with recommendations 
to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, 2015/2103(INL) (May 31, 2016).
162. This is the legal framework with regard to deficient products.
163. The characteristics of a smart robot are as follows: acquires autonomy through sen-
sors and/or by exchanging data with its environment (inter-connectivity) and trades and anal-
yses data; is self-learning (optional criterion); has a physical support; adapts its behaviors and 
actions to its environment. European Parliament Comm. on Legal Affairs, Civil Law Rules on 
Robotics, at 6-7 (2016).
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rules on liability are insufficient because they “cover cases where the cause
of the act or omission can be traced back to a specific human agent such as
the manufacturer, the owner or the user, and where that agent could have
foreseen and avoided the harmful behavior. . .[I]n the scenario where a ro-
bot can take autonomous decisions, the traditional rules will not suffice to
activate liability, since they would not make it possible to identify the party
responsible for providing compensation and to require this party to make
good the damage it has caused.”164 It therefore suggested that a rule of strict
liability should be applied to damages caused by smart robots, requiring on-
ly proof of a causal link between the harmful behavior of the robot and the
damage suffered by the injured party. It also suggested the creation of an
obligatory insurance scheme for the harm caused by robots.165 Suggestion
for strict liability might limit the incentives of designers of algorithms to en-
able the user to reprogram them to better fit his own uses, thereby potential-
ly limiting welfare and growth. We therefore suggest a more nuanced rule,
which applies strict liability only in rare cases in which the risk of harm is
high and should have been known.
3. Regulatory Tools that Promote Negative Freedom
The third issue relates to the effects of algorithmic assistants on laws 
which are designed to promote autonomy through negative freedom. Con-
sumer law provides a useful example since its goal is to ensure that the con-
sumer is not restricted or misled in his decisional parameters.
Algorithmic assistants affect the application of consumer law in at least 
two ways. The first focuses on their potential ability to better detect mis-
leading information or unfair contractual terms,166 given their capacity to 
more efficiently analyze information than human consumers. Furthermore, 
this ability might reduce suppliers’ incentives to engage in such conduct, 
thereby creating a (partial) market solution to the problem. A dynamic inter-
action will most likely develop: suppliers will seek ways to evade algo-
rithms’ methods of detecting misleading information, the algorithms will be 
programmed to overcome these evasion mechanisms, and so forth.
The second way in which algorithmic assistants might affect the appli-
cation of consumer law is through their potential buyer power as noted 
above, which could, at least to some degree, counteract suppliers’ power, 
and reduce the latter’s ability to create one-sided boilerplate contracts. Once 
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Hans Micklitz et al., The Empire Strikes Back: Digital Control of Unfair 
Terms of Online Services, 40 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 367 (2017); Marco Lippi et al., Automated 
Detection of Unfair Clauses in Online Consumer Contracts, in LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 145, 146 (A. Wyner & G. Casini eds., 2017).
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again, algorithmic assistants create market solutions that reduce the need to 
apply consumer law.
The above raises intriguing questions: should the enhanced ability of 
algorithmic assistants to detect unfair contractual terms reduce the responsi-
bility of suppliers found to demand such terms? Put differently: Should we 
allow a supplier to rely on this enhanced ability of algorithms in order to 
claim that no harm was expected? Can a supplier claim that the mere deci-
sion to include such contractual terms in such an environment should be 
treated as an indication that he did not believe it to be unfair, given that us-
ing unfair contractual terms in such an environment would have been 
against his interest? Similarly, with regard to countervailing buyer power, 
does the fact that consumers may enjoy stronger buyer power through the 
use of algorithmic assistants reduce the need to apply limitations on boiler-
plate contracts? Does it change suppliers’ level of responsibility?
These are difficult questions that go to the heart of the law’s goals, 
which need to be answered in our new economy. Our basic intuition is not 
to allow suppliers to take a cynical advantage of algorithmic assistants. At 
the same time, technological developments may justifiably change regulato-
ry priorities, especially in a world of scarce enforcement resources. One rel-
evant factor that should be taken into account is the ability of suppliers to 
differentiate between those consumers who have other options and enjoy 
buyer power, and those who do not. In addition, new laws may need to be 
created to mandate suppliers to provide information about their products 
that can be easily readable by algorithms.167
At the same time, we might need to create new laws designed to curb 
abuses by consumers rather than by suppliers, a direct result of the increased 
abilities and powers of consumers operating through algorithms. This 
change of focus requires fresh thinking, outside the box, but can rely on 
some of the conceptions for abuse that apply to suppliers. Another area 
where fresh thinking is required is how to define manipulations and mis-
leading information in a world in which algorithms analyze information and 
make decisions. To give a simple example, if an algorithm purposefully 
places much emphasis on the user’s past decisions or on the decisions of his 
peers, thereby changing the user’s consumption habits, would this be con-
sidered unwarranted manipulation and if so, under what circumstances?168
One conclusion from the discussion of the three legal challenges is that 
the legal consequences of the use of algorithms depend on and are affected 
by the level of autonomy employed by the algorithm in its decision-making 
process. Accordingly, algorithms based on machine learning and thereby 
167. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 17.
168. Manipulation can be broadly defined as the interference with the way that the other 
“reaches decisions, forms preferences, or adopts goals.” The legal issue is when such manipu-
lation is or should be prohibited by law. See, Benkler, supra, note 18, at 38.
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not based directly on the user’s choices, while potentially increasing the 
benefits to users, also create the strongest challenges to legal doctrines de-
signed to apply to human choice.169 Another conclusion is that the 
knowledge and understanding of the user of the algorithm’s decision-
making process, as well as his potential influence over it, affect the legal re-
sult.170
One final observation regards freedom of speech. The First Amendment 
protects the expressive freedom of individuals which serves their autonomy 
as well as the democratic discourse.171 Expressive freedom, in turn, is based 
on the exposure of individuals to information on which they can form their 
ideas, and on their ability to express the ideas formed. As Yochai Benkler, 
Owen Fiss and others have forcefully argued, limiting exposure through di-
rect or indirect state-imposed limitations such as intellectual property rights 
and information laws harms the right to exercise the freedom of speech.172
Algorithmic assistants create an even greater conflict, given that the auton-
omy deficit is voluntary and self-imposed.173 Furthermore, as observed 
above, they may create a conflict between short-term and long-term auton-
omy if they diminish a person’s ability to form preferences.174 Yet while al-
gorithmic assistants may systematically reduce the ability of users to create 
preferences on their own, they also increase the range of options available to 
users, of both final options of action as well as how to exercise their auton-
omy. These issues deserve a study of their own.
V.  Conclusion
Tomorrow’s cyberspace will include algorithmic assistants, which will 
make decisions for their users, based on users’ digital profiles, selecting
products services, and actions for the real world. Some of these algorithms 
already exist today, and others are fast-developing, as the intersection of in-
formation technology, big data, and cognitive science enables the creation 
of more powerful, faster, and more intelligent algorithmic decision-makers.
169. See Karanasiou & Pinotsis, supra note 34, at 5.
170. See also Meg Leta Jones, The Ironies of Automation Law: Tying Policy Knots with
Fair Automation Practices Principles, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 77, 113-115 (2015).
171. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.  357, 375 (1927) (“Those who won our 
independence believed that the final end of the state was to make men free to develop their 
faculties, and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.”).
172. Benkler, supra note 18, at 27. See also Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common 
Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
354 (1999); OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY 
USES OF STATE POWER 37-38 (1996); Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amend-
ment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1517 (1997).
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Elkin-Koren, supra note 9, at 125-38.
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What is unique about autonomous algorithmic assistants is that they by-
pass the individual’s autonomous decision-making process. Autonomous 
choice is a cornerstone of our social, economic, psychological and political 
systems. Therefore, it is essential to explore whether the introduction of al-
gorithmic assistants will serve social welfare despite their limitations of 
human autonomous choice. Indeed, before submitting to the convenience 
and efficiency that algorithmic assistants may offer, we must be attentive to 
their effects on our choices, determining our decisions according to parame-
ters that are sometimes outside our control and even understanding.
This was the main goal of this article. As shown, most of the rationales 
that hold for human autonomous choice are not significantly harmed by the 
employment of algorithms, at least in some sub-sets of decisions. At the 
same time, while algorithmic assistants may enjoy significant comparative 
advantages over autonomous human choice in many decisions, which grow 
with the advent of new methods to determine human preferences, autono-
mous-choice rationales may still justify human decision-making in some in-
stances. Defining such instances is timely and essential, as otherwise we 
might miss the opportunity to ensure that the use of algorithmic assistants 
indeed fits our needs, preferences, and values. Interestingly, as shown, while 
some of the challenges to autonomous choice created by algorithmic con-
sumers are inherent, others can be solved by the market or through techno-
logical means, possibly even through algorithms.
Our second goal was to identify and analyze some of the regulatory 
challenges that arise from algorithmic decisions in a system designed to ap-
ply to human choices. We identified three main areas of law—consent, in-
tent, and laws that protect freedom of choice—that need to be reconfigured 
to deal effectively with this new technological challenge. The article argues 
that new forms of regulation are necessary to meet some of the new techno-
logical challenges to autonomous choice. Finally, we identified some cases 
in which the use of autonomous algorithmic assistants should not be al-
lowed, in light of its relationship with autonomous choice. We hope that this 
article will serve as a basis for further discussions on the policy choices we 
make with regard to this new and fast emerging technology.
